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ASSURING THE QUALITY OF CARE AND LIFE
IN NURSING HOMES: THE DILEMMA OF
ENFORCEMENT
PATRICIA A. BUTLERt
The elderly population of our society is growing at a rate greater
than that of any other group,' but the number of extended families in
which younger generations care for older ones is declining.2 Approxi-
mately 1.5 million older Americans with chronic illness or disability,
six percent of the population over sixty-five,3 now reside in nursing
homes a Although many of the elderly infirm or disabled who require
long-term health care could be served by noninstitutional services
while living at home,' the Medicaid and Medicare programs create al-
most insurmountable obstacles to the development and survival of out-
patient long-term care providers and instead guarantee the continued
existence of the nursing home as the primary provider of long-term
health care services for the elderly, at least in the foreseeable future.
Recent history demonstrates, however, that nursing homes in general
provide neither a dignified, homelike, supportive atmosphere for their
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rado Department of Health. B.A. 1966, University of California at Berkeley; J.D. 1969, Boalt Hall
School of Law, University of California at Berkeley. The author gratefully acknowledges the
assistance of John Holland, Denver, Colorado, and Nancy Coleman, Senate Special Committee
on Aging, in the preparation of this article.
1. See Butler, The Economics ofAging: 4re We Asking the Wrong Questions, 44 NAT'L J.
1792 (1978).
2. See F. Moss & V. HALAMANDARIS, Too OLD, Too SICK, Too BAD: NURSING HOMES IN
AMERICA (1977). See also Levey & Amidon, The Evolution ofExtended Care Facilities, NURSING
HOMES, August 1967, at 14, 17.
3. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, LONG-TERM CARE FOR THE ELDERLY AND DIs-
ABLED 8 (Feb. 1977). Of the 25 million persons over 65 in the United States today, 5 million are
chronically ill and require some form of long-term health care, while another 3 million are physi-
cally disabled. Id. Yet fewer than one-third are receiving care under formal programs, DEP'T
HEW, OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING & EVALUATION, STATISTICS (1977), while the others receive
care from families or no care at all.
4. A profile of these residents reveals that their average age is 82; 70% are over age 70, with
the percentage of residents in this age bracket increasing; women outnumber men 3 to 1; only 10%
have a living spouse; more than 50% have no close relatives; 96% are white; fewer than 50% are
ambulatory; they remain in the nursing home an average of 2.4 years; at least 55% are mentally
impaired; 33% are incontinent; more than 60% have no visitors at all; and only 30% will return
home-some will transfer to other institutions, but many die in the nursing home. F. Moss & V.
HALAMANDARIS, supra note 2, at 8.
5. Id. at 18-19.
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residents nor the rehabilitative services necessary to assist their resi-
dents in attaining a maximum level of functional capacity and indepen-
dence.6 Since these services are arguably required as a condition of
receiving public funds,7 both the residents and taxpayers, who furnish
approximately one-half of the $12 billion required to run these homes,'
are defrauded by their absence.
The task of establishing standards by which to measure the quality
of care in nursing homes and a system of enforcing those standards has
fallen to the state agencies that license nursing homes and certify their
qualification to participate in Medicaid and Medicare. These stan-
dards, however, are usually patterned after those of hospitals and have
generally emphasized physical facility structure and staffing ratios, dis-
regarding the differences between the medical, residential, social and
emotional needs of nursing home and hospital patients. The Medicaid
program, which finances sixty percent of all nursing home costs,9 exac-
erbates this "medical model" by reimbursement policies that favor in-
stitutional rather than outpatient long-term care services. State
agencies charged with the responsibility to enforce quality of care re-
quirements have failed to administer even the standards that do exist
because they are stymied by sluggish bureaucrats and limited, ineffec-
tive administrative remedies. This article will look at some possible
6. See SUBCOMM. ON LONG-TERM CARE OF THE SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING,
NURSING HOME CARE IN THE UNITED STATES: FAILURE IN PUBLIC POLICY, INTRODUCTORY
REPORT, S. REP. No. 93-1420, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter cited as INTRODUCTORY
REP.]. See also AFL-CIO, AMERICA'S NURSING HOMES: PROFIT IN HUMAN MISERY (1977);
Brown, An Appraisal of the Nursing Home Enforcement Process, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 304, 311-13
(1975): COLORADO ATT'Y GEN., REPORT CONCERNING THE REGULATION OF THE NURSING
HOME INDUSTRY IN THE STATE OF COLORADO (1977); JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COMMITTEE,
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, LONG-TERM
CARE FOR THE AGED, PART 11 (1977); NEW YORK STATE MORELAND ACT COMMISSION, LONG
TERM CARE REGULATION: PAST LAPSES, FUTURE PROSPECTS (1976); OHIO NURSING HOME
COMMISSION, A PROGRAM IN CRISIS (1978) [hereinafter cited as OHIO REP.].
7. See INTRODUCTORY REP., supra note 6.
8. The nursing home industry currently receives over $6 billion annually in government
funds out of total revenues of $12 billion. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, DEP'T
HEW, AN OVERVIEW OF NURSING HOME CHARACTERISTICS: PROVISIONAL DATA FROM THE
1977 NATIONAL NURSING HOME SURVEY, ADVANCEDATA FROM VITAL & HEALTH STATISTICS,
No. 35 (1978) [hereinafter cited as ADVANCEDATA No. 35] at 6. Over $5 billion of these funds
come from Medicaid alone. INSTITUTE FOR MEDICAID MANAGEMENT, DEP'T HEW, DATA ON
THE MEDICAID PROGRAM: ELIGIBILITY/SERVICES/EXPENDITURES FISCAL YEARS 1966-77 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as MEDICAID DATA] at 31. Total government funding of nursing homes has
increased 2000% since 1960 and is expected to reach $9 billion in 1979. Id.
9. Classified by source of payment, nursing home residents nationally are supported 60% by
Medicaid, 2% by Medicare and 38% by private sources. MEDICAID DATA, supra note 8, at 6-7. On
the average, 40% of the nation's expenditures for Medicaid go to nursing home care; the percent-




means by which regulating agencies and the public, including nursing
home residents themselves, can improve the quality of nursing home
care, as well as discuss some of the legal, political and practical difficul-
ties they face in attempting to do so.
I. ENFORCING THE QUALITY OF CARE AND LIFE IN NURSING
HOMES
A. State Licensing
The growth of the nursing home industry was spurred by the avail-
ability of federal funds under the Old Age Assistance provisions of the
Social Security Act of 1935.10 Over the next fifteen years, thirty-five
states began to license or otherwise regulate these facilities." The im-
petus for state regulation was increased, however, by Congress' 1950
amendments of the Act, which permitted the payment of federal funds
directly to the providers of care (called "vendors"), rather than to bene-
ficiaries, on the condition that states establish and enforce standards for
institutions receiving such funding.' 2 In response to this legislation, the
remaining states developed licensing systems for nursing homes.13 The
state licensing standards were based on hospital standards'4 and thus
reflected the tenor of thinking in long-term health care-that the chron-
ically ill and disabled in nursing homes primarily required medical in-
tervention, albeit at a less intensive level than that provided by
hospitals. They also reflected the contemporary view of how to regu-
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1396; (1976). See Wing & Craige, Health Care Regulation: Dilemma of a
Partially Developed Public Policy, this Symposium, at text accompanying notes 116-19.
11. Lander, Licensing of Health Care Facilities, in ISSUES IN HEALTH LAW: A RESOURCE
HANDBOOK (R. Romer & G. McKray, eds. 1979).
12. Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, ch. 809, § 303, 64 Stat. 477 (1950) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The 1935 Act, supra note 10, provided federal funds
(to be matched by state funds) for income maintenance for the elderly and expressly prohibited
payments for persons in public institutions. The existence of public funds, available for the first
time to private boarding home owners, spurred a cottage industry of nursing homes. After more
than a decade of experience, Congress recognized that a sufficient number of good homes did not
exist and in the 1950 Amendments altered the limitation on the receipt of funds by public institu-
tions to exclude only public nonmedical institutions, opening the door to the development of
public nursing care facilities. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, NURSING HOMES AND
THE CONGRESS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES, HD7106D (1972) [hereinafter
cited as CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE]; Levey & Amidon, supra note 2, at 17.
13. See Lander, supra note 11. State licensing authority has been upheld against constitu-
tional challenge as a proper exercise of the state's police power to promote public health and
protect public safety. See, e.g., Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1888); Goodwin v.
Oklahoma, 436 F. Supp. 583 (W.D. Okla. 1977); Father Basil's Lodge, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 393
Ill. 246, 65 N.E.2d 805 (1946).
14. DEP'T HEW, LONG-TERM CARE FACILITY IMPROVEMENT STUDY: INTRODUCTORY RE-
PORT 3 (1975) [hereinafter cited as IMPROVEMENT STUDY].
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late quality of care in acute care settings in their emphasis upon stan-
dards for the physical plant and the numbers and type of staff to attend
hospital patients, standards that were later to be characterized as
"structural."15
B. Medicaid and Medicare Certiflcation
1. The Medicaid and Medicare Programs
The Medicaid and Medicare programs, which were established by
the 1965 amendments to the Social Security Act,' 6 were conceived
amidst a long and bitter debate between forces attempting to develop a
comprehensive health insurance program for the elderly and those op-
posing all federal intervention in delivering health care. In a compro-
mise designed to enlist the support of competing interest groups,
congressional leaders developed a three-part program. Medicare, Title
XVIII of the Social Security Act, had two parts: Part A, Hospital In-
surance for the Aged, which paid for a specified number of hospital,
nursing home and home nursing services, was financed and adminis-
tered by the Social Security Administration and was designed to please
the hospital lobby; and Part B, Supplementary Medical Insurance,
which was financed through individual premiums and administered
through private insurance carriers, paid for physicians' services accord-
ing to their "usual and customary" fees, and was designed to attract
support from the medical profession and the insurance industry. Medi-
caid, Title XIX of the Social Security Act, was drafted at the end of
four years of debate over health insurance for the elderly. It provided a
broad range of services to the indigent and was jointly administered
and funded by the state and federal governments. Medicaid was
designed to appease numerous interests, including state and local gov-
ernments, the medical establishment, and the hospital industry, all of
which felt that they had borne too great a burden in providing charity
care in the previous decade. Medicaid extended the existing welfare
vendor payment system, which previously had paid for health care for
welfare recipients, to groups of non-welfare recipients as well.
Although nursing home standards for Medicaid and Medicare be-
came identical under the 1972 Social Security amendments, ' 7 the two
15. See note 65 and accompanying text infra.
16. Social Security Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42, 45 U.S.C.).
17. Social Security Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 246, 86 Stat. 1329 (1972)
(codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395x(j), 1396a(a)(38) (1976)).
[Vol. 571320
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programs are quite distinct, serving different population groups and
providing a different scope of nursing home benefits. Medicare is
drafted to resemble a health insurance program. All recipients of So-
cial Security payments who reach age sixty-five' 8 or have received so-
cial security disability payments for twenty-four months 9 are eligible
for Part A of the Medicare program, which provides limited hospital
services20 and services in a skilled nursing facility for up to 100 days
21
per "spell of illness," 22 but only for persons hospitalized for the same
illness for at least three days. Nursing homes under Medicare were
originally called "Extended Care Facilities" (ECFs), denoting the origi-
nal concept of a short-term, less intensive "extension" of a hospital
stay. Part A also provides home health care-the services of visiting
nurses and nurse's aides for persons discharged from a hospital or nurs-
ing facility.23 Part B of the Medicare program, for which persons over
65 or disabled must pay a monthly premium,24 finances physician serv-
ices and home health care services without the prerequisite institution-
alization required by Part A.25
Medicaid serves an entirely different population: persons receiv-
ing welfare under one of the federal categories-the aged, blind or dis-
abled, or families with children deprived of parental support (the
"categorically needy").26 States may also cover persons physically
"linked" to those categories whose incomes exceed the welfare eligibil-
ity levels, yet who are unable to meet the costs of health care (the
"medically needy").27 States choose to participate in Medicaid and de-
sign their systems individually, within the parameters of federal re-
quirements regarding eligibility, benefits, payment for providers of
health care and standards for provider participation.28 Medicaid law
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c, 426(a) (1976).
19. Id. §§ 1395c, 402(d)-(f), 423.
20. Id. § 1395d(a)(1).
21. Id. § 1395d(a)(2).
22. A spell of illness is an acute illness requiring institutionalization; it ends after 60 days
have passed in which the Medicare beneficiary was not an inpatient of a hospital or nursing home.
Id. § 1395x(a).
23. Id. § 1395d(a)(3).
24. Id. §§ 1395p, 1395r.
25. Id. §§ 1395k(a), 1395x(s).
26. Id. §§ 1396, 1396a(a)(10)(A).
27. Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(C).
28. At the state level, Medicaid is administered by a "single state agency," id.
§ 1396a(a)(5)(1976), which is often the state welfare agency but rarely the state health department.
The federal government shares between 50% and 83% of the cost of the program's administration.
Id. § 1396d(b). Medicaid law also requires states to provide certain basic services: inpatient and
outpatient hospital services, physician services, x-ray and laboratory services, skilled nursing
1979] 1321
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requires that all states pay for care in skilled nursing facilities (SNFs),
and permits coverage of care in intermediate care facilities (ICFs). 9
2. Development of Medicaid Standards and Medicare Conditions of
Participation
The Medicaid statute did not set standards for nursing homes, but
left that task primarily to each state, with the congressional directive to
improve quality of care standards and enforcement.3 0 Originally, the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) required states
to apply Medicare standards for ECFs to Medicaid nursing homes.'
But after congressional pressure and the enactment of a minimum set
of statutory Medicaid nursing home requirements in 1968, HEW
adopted regulations that established much less stringent conditions for
Medicaid-certified nursing homes.3 2
facility services, and family planning and early childhood screening services. Id. § 1396d(a)(I)-
(5). States may also choose to provide, with matching federal funds, various optional services,
including drugs, prosthetic devices, dental care and intermediate care facility services. Id.
§ 1396d(a)(6)-(17).
29. Id. § 1396d(a)(15). ICFs are institutions that provide less intensive nursing care than
SNFs, and therefore presumably serve a more functional and less ill population. The average
SNF under Medicaid and Medicare contains 100 beds; the average Medicaid ICF contains 57
beds. Kane & Kane, Care ofthe.Aged" OldProblems in Need of New Solutions, 200 ScIENcE 813,
814 (Table 1) (1978). All nursing care facilities average 64 employees per 100 beds. This profile
contrasts sharply with that of the average American hospital, which has 160 beds and 243 employ-
ees per 100 beds. Id. ICF services were added to the Medicaid program in 1971. Act of Dec. 28,
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-223, § 4(a), 85 Stat. 809 (1971) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396d (1976)).
30. S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 76 (1975).
31. DEP'T HEW, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, cited in President's
Proposalfor Revision in the Social Security System: Hearings on H.R. 5710 Before the House Ways
and Means Comm., 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 355 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on 11.R, 5710].
32. 33 Fed. Reg. 16,165 (1968); 34 Fed. Reg. 9788 (1969). The American Nursing Home
Association, representing proprietary facilities and joined by many congressional leaders, argued
that HEW was not authorized to establish national standards. Hearings on II.R. 5710, supra note
31, at 353-58. In a sharply worded rebuttal, former HEW Secretary Wilbur Cohen testified before
the House Ways and Means Committee that the agency did indeed have the power to issue fairly
detailed nursing home standards for Medicaid participation. Id. at 353-63. The 1967 Social Se-
curity Amendments to Medicaid and Medicare included requirements that state Medicaid pro-
grams compel nursing homes to maintain an organized nursing service, plan menus, maintain
satisfactory policies and procedures for medical records, drugs, physician care and emergency
medical services, set up a transfer agreement with a hospital, and comply with the 1967 Life Safety
Code. Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 234(a), 81 Stat. 906 (1968)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (1976)); see Hearing Before Senate Finance Comm. on H.R. 12080,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 893-97 (1967). Since these standards were narrower than those under Medi-
care, HEW may have felt that their adoption undermined its earlier posture. It first published
guidelines and later adopted formal regulations on nursing home standards in which it retreated
from requiring application of the Medicare standards and established much less stringent condi-
tions for Medicaid nursing homes. 33 Fed. Reg. 16,165 (1968); 34 Fed. Reg. 9788 (1969).
In 1969, Senator Frank Moss, chairman of the Long-Term Care Subcommittee of the Senate
Special Committee on Aging, began a series of thirty hearings on problems in the nursing home
industry. Senate Special Comm. on Aging, Trends in Long-Term Care.- Hearings Before the
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Medicare certification standards, called "Conditions of Participa-
tion," were developed in 1966 and revised in 1974.31 They followed the
pattern set by state licensing standards of the 1950's and the perspective
that persons in Medicare nursing homes primarily required medical
services. The standards were developed under the "hospital model,"
regulating the physical and staffing structure of the facilities and re-
quiring the existence of written policies and procedures.34
After the 1972 Social Security amendments, which provided a
common definition of skilled nursing facilities under both Medicaid
and Medicare, HEW issued regulations establishing eighteen "Condi-
tions of Participation" to be applied to SNFs that are certified under
either program. These conditions include standards for administration,
resident services, sanitation and physical plant.
Subcomm. on Long-Term Care ofthe Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 9lst-94th Congresses (1969-
1975). The hearings resulted in a seven-volume report that revealed scandalous problems of fire
safety violations, patient abuse, financial mismanagement and corruption and a shockingly low
quality of care in the nation's nursing homes, combined with a total failure by HEW and the states
to adopt standards and enforcement techniques to provide protection against those abuses. The
Subcommittee on Long-Term Care drafted nine supporting papers to its overall report. THE LIT-
ANY OF NURSING HOME ABUSES AND AN EXAMINATION OF THE ROOTS OF CONTROVERSY (1974);
DRUGS IN NURSING HOMES: MISUSE, HIGH COSTS, AND KICKBACKS (1975); DOCTORS IN NURS-
ING HOMES: THE SHUNNED RESPONSIBILITY (1975); NURSES IN NURSING HOMES: THE HEAVY
BURDEN (1975); THE CONTINUING CHRONICLE OF NURSING HOME FIRES (1975); WHAT CAN BE
DONE IN NURSING HOMES: POSITIVE ASPECTS OF LONG-TERM CARE (1975); THE ROLE OF
NURSING HOMES IN CARING FOR DISCHARGED MENTAL PATIENTS (1976); ACCESS TO NURSING
HOMES BY U.S. MINORITIES (1976); and PROFITS AND THE NURSING HOME: INCENTIVES IN
FAVOR OF POOR CARE (1976).
33. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1101, .1120-.1137 (1977). After a 1953 congressional study under the
auspices of the Hill-Burton Hospital Construction program revealed that out of 25,000 long-term
care institutions, only 7,000 provided "skilled nursing care," Congress amended the Hill-Burton
Act to provide federal construction funding for long-term care facilities that were connected to
hospitals or run by public or non-profit organizations. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
supra note 12, at 21. A further congressional study in 1956 disclosed a uniformly poor quality of
care. Id. at 22. These findings were confirmed by a 1960 congressional report that cited problems
of untrained administrators and aides, too few staff, limited services (especially rehabilitation),
lack of physician attendance or medical supervision, inadequate state licensing programs and
gross safety hazards. SUBCOMM. ON PROBLEMS OF THE AGED AND AGING OF THE SENATE COMM.
ON LABOR & PUBLIC WELFARE, THE AGED AND AGING IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL
PROBLEM, S. REP. No. 86-1121, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. VII (1960). In response to these findings,
Congress, with the adoption of Medicaid and Medicare in 1965, required that nursing homes
participating in Medicare comply with specified federal standards. Social Security Act Amend-
ments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42, 45 U.S.C.). The Conditions of Participation are the standards established as a result of this
directive. See 42 C.F.R. § 405.1101 (1977).
34. See IMPROVEMENT STUDY, supra note 14, at 3, 14-15.
35. The Conditions of Participation set standards for (I) state licensure; (2) governing body
and management (including patients' rights); (3) medical direction; (4) physical services; (5) nurs-
ing services; (6) dietetic services; (7) specialized rehabilitative services; (8) pharmaceutical services;
(9) laboratory and X-ray services; (10) dental services; (11) social services; (12) patient activities;
(13) medical records; (14) transfer agreement; (15) physical environment; (16) infection control;
(17) disaster preparedness; and (18) utilization review. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1120-.1137 (1977). In June
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3. Meeting Certification Requirements
State Medicaid agencies and HEW are required to certify skilled
nursing facilities as fully complying with the Medicaid-Medicare certi-
fication standards.36 Facility inspections, which may be unan-
nounced,37 are performed by state facility licensing agencies (usually
state health departments) under contract with HEW and Medicaid
agencies. 38 Teams of surveyors composed of nurses, sanitarians, ad-
ministrators and engineers perform a physical inspection of nursing
home premises, interview patients and staff, and examine documents
and records. If state inspectors discover deficiencies, they submit a "de-
ficiency list" to the facility, which must in return file a "plan of correc-
tion" with the agency, proposing a reasonable schedule for its
correction of the deficiencies. The state agency then visits the facility
again to determine whether the deficiencies have been corrected and
1978, HEW published a notice of its intent to develop new standards, along with "draft specifica-
tions," and a schedule of regional public hearings to entertain comments on the draft and the need
for new regulations. 43 Fed. Reg. 24,873 (1978).
36. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1908 (1977); 43 Fed. Reg. 43,235 (1977) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R.
§ 442.110(a)).
37. Some states expressly require unannounced inspections. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 1421 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); IOWA CODE ANN. § 135C.39 (West Cum. Supp. 1978);
KAN. STAT. § 39-935(4) (Cum. Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144A.10(2) (West Cum. Supp.
1978). The use of unannounced nursing home inspections was upheld in California against a
challenge based on the fourth amendment protection against unlawful searches and seizures in
People v. White, 65 Cal. Rptr. 923, 259 Cal. App. 2d 936 (1968). A nursing home owner convicted
of a misdemeanor for not keeping 40 hours of registered nurse coverage, as required by state law,
challenged the unannounced inspection that formed the basis of the conviction. The court had to
contend with the recent Supreme Court cases of Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967),
and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), which invalidated searches under state police
powers. The California court held that "searches or seizures made pursuant to licensing statutes
which require inspection are valid and not subject to constitutional objection," on the grounds
that the licensee had consented to inspections as a condition of licensure and that the facility was
open to the public. The court said that "acceptance of a license to operate a hospital is an implied
consent to such supervision and inspection as is required by the licensing statute involved." 65
Cal. Rptr. at 927, 259 Cal. App. 2d at 939.
The recent Supreme Court case of Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), invalidat-
ing as a violation of the fourth amendment warrantless inspections by the Department of Labor
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, does not undercut the holding in White.
The Supreme Court held that an exception to the fourth amendment's requirement of a search
warrant exists in cases of "pervasively regulated businesses" in which each owner has "voluntarily
chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulation," id. at 313, the second
ground of the decision in Wite. Moreover, one of the reasons for the Marshall Court's applica-
tion of the warrant requirement to OSHA inspections was that such a requirement would not
hamper OSHA's enforcement. Id.; see Note, 57 N.C.L. REv. 320, 329-30 (1979). Although Fed-
eral law permits, but does not require, unannounced nursing home inspections, at least one state
has found them necessary for meaningful enforcement of the Medicaid-Medicare certification
standards, OHio REP., supra note 6, at 23, and the reasoning of the Court in Marshall therefore
should not apply to such inspections.
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395aa(a), 1396a(a)(33) (1976).
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whether others have developed. If, in the opinion of the state inspec-
tors, the facility complies with the federal standards, it recommends
that HEW certify the facility for participation in Medicare and that the
state Medicaid agency certify it for participation in Medicaid. If HEW
accepts this recommendation, it will execute a one-year Provider
Agreement with the facility that entitles it to accept Medicare patients
and receive reimbursement for them.
Institutions are now required by law to comply with the Medicaid-
Medicare standards in order to be certified to participate in either pro-
gram. The regulations, however, permit a facility with deficiencies to
be certified if the deficiencies do not jeopardize patient health and
safety nor seriously limit the facility's capability to provide adequate
care and if it submits an acceptable plan for correcting the deficiencies
within twelve months of inspection. 39 If the same deficiency is appar-
ent during a subsequent certification period, the nursing home cannot
be certified for continued Medicare or Medicaid participation unless it
was in compliance at some time during this subsequent period, made a
"good faith effort" to comply and was unable to do so "for reasons
beyond its control."' 40 The state agency must document the evidence in
support of these required findings.41
A facility with deficiencies may be certified for fewer than twelve
months under the above conditions. In addition, the Medicaid agency
or HEW may certify a facility for a period ending not more than sixty
days after the last day specified in its plan for correcting the deficiencies
or may issue a conditional certification with an automatic cancellation
clause.42 The certification would thus expire upon the condition subse-
quent that the facility had not made substantial progress in correcting
the deficiency by a certain date, which must be no longer than sixty
days after the date for correction in the plan of correction.
43
Nursing home certification under Medicaid was traditionally han-
dled differently from that under Medicare, but since the 1972 Social
Security Act amendments" the two systems have been identical. Origi-
39. 42 C.F.R. §§ 442.105(a), (b), 405.1905(a),.1907(a) (1977).
40. Id. §§ 405.1908(d), 442.105(d).
41. Id. §§ 405.1903, 442.105(a). That the certifying agency has only these choices and must
document them in its records suggests that, despite the recognized doctrine of prosecutorial discre-
tion, an agency could be required to take some action against facilities not meeting the certifica-
tion conditions.
42. Id. §§ 405.1908(a), 442.111(b), (c).
43. Id.
44. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 246, 86 Stat. 1424-25 (1972)
(codified in scattered subsections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395, 1396 (1976)).
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nally, the state Medicaid agency (often the state welfare department
rather than the health department) was required to survey facilities for
participation under Medicaid. Sometimes state Medicaid agencies con-
tracted with state licensing agencies to perform this function, but such
arrangements were not mandatory. Furthermore, states developed
their own Medicaid nursing home certification standards, which were
not necessarily identical to those under Medicare. Concern over recog-
nized problems of the quality of care in nursing homes and the ineffi-
ciency of different standards and survey processes among state
licensing and certification agencies prompted Congress in 1972 to con-
solidate ECFs under Medicare and SNFs under Medicaid into the sin-
gle rubric of "skilled nursing facility."45 In addition to adopting a
single set of nursing facility standards, Congress required that the state
licensing agency inspect and recommend certification for both Medi-
caid and Medicare, ending the bifurcation of this function in some
states. SNFs certified by HEW to participate in Medicare are automat-
ically qualified for Medicaid participation. 6 They must, however, exe-
cute separate annual Provider Agreements-one with HEW for
Medicare and one with the Medicaid agency. Facilities choosing to
serve only Medicaid beneficiaries must be certified by the state Medi-
caid agency, with HEW determining compliance with Life Safety Code
requirements.47
State Medicaid agencies certify intermediate care facilities under
circumstances similar to those for certification of SNFs.48 The federal
regulations, however, contain special provisions for certifying ICFs
with deficiencies in environmental, sanitation, Life Safety Code and
physical space standards.49
In 1972 Congress also mandated the payment of the entire cost of
the state survey-certification process under Medicaid out of federal
45. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 249A, 86 Stat. 1424-25 (1972)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395x(j), 1396a(a) (38)(1976)).
46. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 248, 86 Stat. 1424-25 (1972)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396i(a) (1976)).
47. In proposing this amendment, the Senate Finance Committee stated that it was
not intended to result in any dilution or weakening of standards for skilled nursing facili-
ties. As at present, a State may continue to require higher standards of skilled nursing
facilities than those mandated by Federal statute and regulation. Where a State imposes
additional requirements in its own right, then, as under the present section 1863, those
standards would apply to both Medicare and Medicaid skilled nursing facilities in the
State.
S. REP. No. 92-1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 281-82 (1972).
48. 42 C.F.R. §§ 442.30, .105, .111 (1977).
49. Id. §§442.112, .113.
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funds." Medicare survey costs had always been exclusively federally
funded, but prior to 1972 Medicaid survey costs had only been matched
at the administrative matching rate of seventy-five percent.-' By pay-
ing one hundred percent of the costs of surveying and certifying SNFs
under Medicaid and by adopting federal standards for SNF certifica-
tion and the surveying process, Congress made a major commitment to
enforcing quality of care and life in the nation's nursing homes.
II. PROBLEMS IN QUALITY OF CARE ENFORCEMENT
There are several theories about the forces that operate in a regu-
lated industry. One theory is that the regulators are captured by the
regulated industry and champion its objectives.52 For example, it is
often alleged that federal regulatory agencies, such as the Interstate
Commerce Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board, advocate the
interests of the regulated industry rather than the public interests they
were presumably established to protect. 3 Another theory is that the
regulated industries demand regulation, such as professional licensure,
in order to maintain a market monopoly. Still other theorists main-
tain that the regulatory bureaucracy itself drives and sustains the initia-
tive for regulation.55 For instance, one study of the demand for
licensing clinical laboratory technicians in California concluded that
the state licensing agency rather than the public or the licensees ini-
tially demanded and then sustained interest in regulating this profes-
sion.56 It is possible to find all these forces at work in the life cycle of a
regulatory process: a regulatory system is born out of public pressure
to solve an identified social problem; initially, the established agency
handles problems aggressively and creatively, but is faced with mount-
ing pressure from the regulated activity; the agency loses vocal and ac-
50. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 239, 86 Stat. 1424-25 (1972)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a)(4) (1976)).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a)(2) (1976).
52. See M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 25-49 (1955):
Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1105
(1954); Navarro, Social Class, Political Power, and The State, 1 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 256
(1976); Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 4 BELL J. ECON. & MANAGEMENT Sci. 335
(1974).
53. Jaffe, supra note 52, at 1109-1113.
54. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MANAGEMENT SCI. 1, 3-
21 (1971). The Federal Trade Commission is investigating the monopolistic potential of health
personnel licensure.
55. Wilson, The Dead Hand of Regulation, 25 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 39, 47-48 (1971).
56. W. WHITE, PUBLIC HEALTH AND PRIVATE GAIN: THE ECONOMICS OF LICENSING
CLINICAL LABORATORY PERSONNEL (1979).
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tive public support and becomes devitalized, adjusting to an
atmosphere in which it functions less as a regulator and more as a con-
sultant-manager and begins to be the captive of the regulated industry;
the agency is abandoned by the public and does not undertake an ac-
tive regulatory role; finally, with diminished funding, public support
and internal initiative, the agency becomes debilitated and
ineffectual.
5 7
The nursing home enforcement processes in most states are char-
acterized by this regulatory life-cycle. Despite periods of creative and
aggressive enforcement, most licensing agencies are ineffective because
of inadequate funding, apathetic personnel, cumbersome legal reme-
dies, inappropriate standards, interagency fragmentation and maldistri-
bution of long-term care resources. Enforcement agencies are
generally underfunded and thus limited in the personnel available to
perform adequate inspections. This situation has developed because
many state licensing agencies are financed almost exclusively with the
one hundred percent federal funding available for the inspection proc-
ess. Unlike the costs of Medicaid program services, which are reim-
bursed on the basis of all actual expenditures, 58 however, inspection
costs are reimbursed in response to fixed annual budgets, which state
survey agencies must submit to and negotiate with regional HEW of-
fices. Colorado, for instance, whose state licensing standards are simi-
lar to the federal conditions of participation, performs few independent
state licensing functions. Its licensing responsibilities are subsumed
within its federal certification duties. The state relies on over ninety
percent federal funding for its state licensing and Medicare-Medicaid
certification budget.59 Thus, the availability of federal funds directly
determines the extent of the state's nursing home enforcement efforts
under even its own licensing power.
Because of budgetary limitations and limited enforcement pow-
ers,60 agency personnel often become frustrated by a lack of a real abil-
ity to improve nursing home quality, and this frustration leads to
apathy. Nursing home inspectors also face a dilemma of roles, uncer-
tain whether they are "police" or "consultants."' 6' When the public is
not regularly confronted with the immediate and shocking problems in
57. Ruchlin, A New Strategyfor Regulating Long-Term Care Facilities, 2 J. HEALTH POL.,
POL'Y & L. 190, 191 (1977).
58. See notes 50-51 and accompanying text supra.
59. See CoLoRADo ATr'Y GEN., supra note 6.
60. See text accompanying notes 142-169 infra.
61. OHio REP., supra note 6, at 24.
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the industry, public support for regulatory efforts diminishes. This lack
of active public support, combined with the industry's criticism of the
regulators and the fact that inspectors' daily contacts are only with the
regulated facilities, makes it difficult for inspectors to see themselves as
purely objective public servants. There has been a pronounced ten-
dency by surveyors to seek good relationships with, if not cater to, the
nursing homes they regulate.
The lengthy and complicated legal process accompanying revoca-
tion "of nursing home licenses or certification also delays effective regu-
lation and deters agencies from taking aggressive steps. Facilities have
succeeded in applying due process concepts to elevate owners' rights
over the patients' interests, which enforcement agencies purport to pro-
tect.62 Courts require a high standard of proof to sustain agency revo-
cation of a state license or a Medicaid certification and have resisted
efforts to enforce licensing and certification standards that are vague or
subjective.63
Effectiveness of the regulatory system is further compromised by
the fragmentation that exists among regulatory agencies; even after the
1972 Social Security amendments integrating Medicaid and Medicare
enforcement, many states have several agencies responsible for estab-
lishing and enforcing nursing home standards. In many states one
agency may issue certificates of need to build facilities or set facilitiy
rates, another may license and recommend certification of facilities, an-
other may reimburse under Medicaid, another may license health pro-
fessionals, another may inspect for fire safety and another may place
adults in facilities, while Professional Standards Review Organizations
(PSROs) may perform medical review, and the state attorney general's
office may spearhead actual enforcement. At the federal level, HEW
reimburses under Medicare and uses its own system to enforce compli-
ance or revoke certification.' Government tends to solve quality of
care problems by adding more agencies rather than consolidating and
reforming existing ones. Not only is interagency communication and
data sharing usually inadequate or altogether nonexistent, but the
power of Medicaid reimbursement as a quality assurance tool65 is often
lost when the Medicaid agency is not the licensing-certification agency.
62. See notes 129-155 and accompanying text infra.
63. OHIO REP., supra note 6, at 20.
64. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, ENFORCING QUALITY OF CARE IN
NURSING HOMES 10-12 (1978) [hereinafter cited as NAAG REP.].
65. See notes 90-122 and accompanying text infra.
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Distribution of long-term health care resources also has a negative
impact upon regulation if a state or an area is undersupplied with nurs-
ing home beds. In many rural communities with only a single nursing
home, it is politically and practically impossible to close a facility; the
lack of alternative enforcement remedies poses a serious problem in
those situations. The absence of noninstitutional alternatives to nurs-
ing homes, resulting largely from the institutional bias of Medicaid and
Medicare, further aggravates the ineffectiveness of nursing home
enforcement.
III. POSSIBILITIES FOR REFORM
A number of options exist for reform of the existing regulatory
processes that attempt to control the quality of care in nursing homes:
(a) elimination of existing programs and increased reliance on competi-
tion among providers of nursing home services; (b) change in the focus
of regulation to provide new and challenging functions for regulators in
order to revitalize the moribund regulatory system; (c) development of
economic incentives for individual nursing homes to provide high qual-
ity care; (d) enhancement of enforcement mechanisms to provide regu-
lators a greater array of enforcement remedies; and (e) increased public
support for and involvement in the regulatory process. The remainder
of this article will examine each of these options, most of which are
complementary, not exclusive.
A. Stimulating Competition in an Unregulated Market
There is little reason to believe that elimination of regulatory pro-
grams and reliance on market place competition will operate to im-
prove the quality of care, given the present structure of the nursing
home industry and the means by which it is currently financed.
66
Without truly informed consumer judgment and complete freedom of
choice, which will not exist if there is a shortage of facilities or noninsti-
tutional alternatives in an area, simply eliminating the regulatory
processes seems inappropriate. Consumers of nursing home services
are not in a position to judge quality, since they are usually ill and
often impaired. Furthermore, unless accurate quality indices are devel-
oped and made available to the public, individual consumers are inca-
pable of identifying high quality homes in their area that will meet
66. Ruchlin, supra note 57, at 199-200.
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their needs.67 Even if consumers were informed about quality of care
in various institutions and if sufficient beds were available to permit
them to exercise a real choice, consumers often could not make an in-
formed decision about whether to enter a nursing home without access
to noninstitutional alternatives. It is estimated that at least one-third of
the nursing home population is inappropriately placed and would be
capable of remaining in a residential setting if supportive services such
as social services, homemaker services, home health services and recre-
ational activities were available to them.68
The insufficient supply of noninstitutional long-term care results
primarily from the failure of its funding by Medicaid and Medicare.
There have been some proposals to expand Medicare home health care
services.69 A few Medicaid demonstration projects, providing adult
day care services and other non-traditional health care services for the
elderly and disabled, have been federally funded.7 ° These few projects
can hardly be expected to serve even a fraction of the nursing home
population that is inappropriately placed.
The existence of a spectrum of alternatives in long-term health
care, along with informed awareness, could provide the competitive cir-
cumstances that would compel nursing homes to provide visible, high-
quality care at a reasonable cost. But conditions do not currently exist
to permit competition alone to assure nursing home quality of care
without some form of active government intervention.
B. Changing the Regulatory Focus
Some regulation must exist in the long-term health facility field in
order to assure quality of care, but the current regulatory mechanisms
apparently cannot achieve this objective. It might be possible to mini-
67. OHIO REP., supra note 6, at 16-17.
68. The Congressional Budget Office, for example, estimated that 10-20% of SNF residents
and 20-40% of ICF residents are placed at too high a level of care and that many could be cared
for at home or in sheltered living arrangements. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 3,
at 18-19.
69. Proposed H.R. 13097, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) would have eliminated limitations on
home care services under Medicare.
70. The best known adult day care system is provided by On Lok, a center in the Chinatown
section of San Francisco. Lurie, On Lok Senior Day Health Center: A Case Study, GERONTOLO-
GIST, February 1976, at 16. Another experimental approach to providing noninstitutional long-
term care is the community care organization, a channeling agency that assesses the needs of
persons about to enter nursing homes and "brokers" services to fill those needs in the community
to permit long-term care patients to remain at home. Community care organizations have been
funded by HEW in Wisconsin and Colorado. New York is experimenting with home health care
services under a federal grant. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH CODE § 2382 (McKinney 1977).
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mize bureaucratic apathy by changing the bureaucrats' jobs and/or by
automating those jobs' inherently unchallenging aspects? 1 Changing
the focus of regulation sufficiently to provide a more creative job and to
infuse new interest and energy into regulators would begin a new regu-
latory life cycle and at least renovate the process temporarily. One
means of refocusing regulation would be to eliminate many of the ex-
tant licensing and certification standards that center only on regulatory
structure and substitute standards that relate to the outcomes of care.
For example, regulators could determine whether nursing home resi-
dents improve or maintain their health status over time rather than de-
teriorate and whether they meet objective or subjective norms and
expectations.
Long-term care facility regulation since 1965 has been based, as
noted above, upon the premise that nursing homes are merely exten-
sions of hospitals, that residents primarly require medical treatment
and that the only valid quality standards are those defining the struc-
ture of the facility. Considering that nursing home services are funded
by Medicare and Medicaid, which pay for medical care, this emphasis
is not surprising. But it has increasingly been recognized that although
some nursing home residents do require fairly intensive nursing care
while recuperating from acute illnesses or when suffering from terminal
illnesses, such as those involving hospitalization, the vast majority of
them have long-term chronic disabilities requiring some nursing care,
but more importantly requiring aid in daily living activities, social serv-
ices, organized activity programs and help in coping with the emotional
and psychological problems of old age, debility and isolation. Thus,
the so-called "medical hospital model" is inappropriate for most nurs-
ing home residents; yet the Medicaid-Medicare certification standards
and most state licensing standards rely upon it.
Three approaches to establishing quality of care regulations for
health facilities have been recognized since the advent of Medicaid and
Medicare-structure, process and outcome measures. 72 Strnctural stan-
dards measure facilities and equipment, numbers and qualifications of
staff, administrative organization and operations, and fiscal systems.
For instance, the Medicare-Medicaid Conditions of Participation in-
clude requirements that facilities have certain physical plant features
71. For an analysis of how job description and responsibility affect performance, see Her-
berg, One More Time: How Do You Motivate Employees?, 46 HARV. Bus. REV. (1968).




and also have policies regarding patients' rights, patient care, staff or-
ganization and services provided. The Conditions generally do not re-
quire examination of the content of the policies or whether they are
implemented. Fewer than 20 of the 541 items on the Medicare-Medi-
caid survey inspection form73 require an examination of the care given
to patients or require surveyors to observe patients. 74 Most of the sur-
veyors' time in the facility is spent reviewing documents, including
staffing charts, menus, policies and procedures. This approach is based
on the assumption that if the structure is appropriate, and the facility
has the capacity to provide good care, good care will be provided.75
The logic of this approach is specious, particularly when better and
more appropriate standards exist to determine whether residents re-
ceive the care to which they are entitled.
Process standards measure the actual care delivered to patients
and compare it to established norms of care throughout the area. For
instance, surveyors using process standards would examine, on a sam-
ple basis, the completeness of information received about a patient
through testing and diagnosis, the appropriateness of prescribed thera-
pies to the diagnoses, and the technical competence of the performance
of diagnostic and therapeutic procedures. Peer review processes, such
as institutional utilization review in hospitals76 and the Professional
Standards Review Organizations (PSROs) 77 employ such a process ap-
proach, using standards developed by community norms of medical
practice.78 In long-term care, as contrasted with hospital care, however,
process standards are more difficult to determine. Norms of care are
relatively easy to establish for acute illnesses for which medical out-
comes can be defined and evaluated. But treatment for chronic medi-
cal conditions, and especially for social problems, is far less easy to
validate. Thus, while some process measures for the long-term care
setting exist, many are still developmental, being demonstrated by, for
example, PSRO long-term care projects.79
73. Form No. SSA 1569. This and all medicare SNF forms are available from the state
licensing agency and HEW offices.
74. OHIO REP., supra note 6, at 14-15.
75. See IMPROVEMENT STUDY, supra note 14, at 14-15.
76. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395x(k), 1396a(a)(30) (1976); 42 C.F.R. §§ 456.50 -. 145, 456.250 -
.348 (1978).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 1320(c) (1976).
78. For an overview of PSRO and utilization review, see Price, Katz & Provence, An Advo-
cate' Guide to Utilization Review, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 307 (1977).
79. Fifteen demonstration projects were funded wherein PSROs assessed quality of care in
nursing homes under Medicaid and Medicare. Some of these projects, such as the one in
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The final approach to regulating quality of care, outcome stan-
dards, focus on the outcome of care and determine whether patients
achieve an expected recovery or stabilize rather than deteriorate. Out-
come measures have been developed to test the effect of a few severe
but chronic conditions such as stroke, heart attacks and hip replace-
ment on activities of daily living,"° but very few outcome measures ex-
ist for long-term care patients' conditions. Theoretically, in applying
an outcome test to a patient, a regulator need not generally be con-
cerned with the means used to achieve the desired outcome so long as
the outcome is achieved."1 Under this theory of regulation, facilities
would be given great flexibility to experiment with innovative forms of
treatment and would be held accountable only for their results. An
outcome approach to regulating quality of care requires considerably
different regulating skills and inspection techniques. A question re-
mains, however, whether outcome standards alone are sufficient. For
example, safety and sanitation standards must remain in effect to pro-
tect patients from disaster or institutional infection. It is often asserted
that required safety equipment such as sprinklers are very costly and
unnecessary for buildings of modern construction.82 Certainly, many
safety requirements, such as the door width standards in the Life Safety
Code, seem minimally related to patient safety and might be eliminated
as outcome standards become the primary basis for enforcement. But
some fire safety standards should persist to protect residents in older
buildings, where nursing home fires have occurred with fatal conse-
quences.8 3 Sanitation standards, to protect residents against food-
borne or airborne contamination, are also necessary, and, unlike some
safety regulations, should not be unduly costly to apply. In light of
these considerations, outcome standards may be inappropriate for
safety and sanitation regulation. Unlike most areas of patient care, in
which patients are not put directly in jeopardy by a retrospective re-
Colorado, developed and tested certain process and outcome standards for long-term care resi-
dents of nursing homes.
80. Katz & Akpom, A Measure of Primary Sociobiological Functions, 6 INT'L J. HEALTH
SERVICEs 493 (1976); Katz & Akpom, Index of ADL, 14 (Supp.) MED. CARE 116 (1976).
81. There might, however, be legitimate reasons why a given individual did not achieve an
expected norm. Therefore, the regulator would have to fall back upon process standards to evalu-
ate the actual care provided to persons who failed to meet given outcome standards.
82. Feeley, Walsh & Fielding, Structural Codes and Patient Safety: Does Strict Enforcement
Make Sense, 3 AM. J. L. & MED. 447, 453 (1976). The authors examine Massachusetts' experience
with nursing home fires and conclude that sprinklers cost from $86,000 to $137,000 per potential
year of life saved.
83. SUBCOMM. ON LONG-TERM CARE OF THE SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, THE CON-
TINUING CHRONICLE OF NURSING HOME FIRES, supra note 32.
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view on a frequent basis, applying fire safety, infection and sanitation
standards on a retrospective basis would subject nursing home resi-
dents to an unacceptable risk.
Both process and outcome measures of quality of care require that
facilities have the capacity to assess accurately the status of their resi-
dents, to determine the care required for a given discovered condition,
to provide that care, and to evaluate continuously its effectiveness. A
regulatory agency employing either of these measures must have the
capacity to validate the facility's own assessment of the resident and
either the outcome of care or the care provided. The agency must also
have the capacity to collect, store and retrieve the information collected
by facilities through their resident assessments and evaluate facility
performance by applying quality of care standards that validly measure
patient status. A certain amount of the routine work of the regulatory
agency can thus be automated, freeing inspectors to perform actual res-
ident assessment and draw conclusions about facility quality
performance.
Considerable work has been done through government and pri-
vate research over the last decade on systems of patient assessment in
long-term care. One of the best known patient assessment systems is
"PACE," the Patient Assessment and Care Evaluation system devel-
oped by the Office of Nursing Home Affairs in HEW from 1974 to
1978.84 Drawing upon the work of Densen, Katz and Jones at the
Harvard Center for Community Health, the PACE system provides an
instrument by which nursing home staff can assess an individual's func-
tional level and determine medical, nursing and social needs. The
"Care Evaluation" component of the system requires the facility staff to
develop a plan of care to meet the assessed needs and to evaluate the
effectiveness of the care by periodic reassessment.8 5 The use of such a
system of patient assessment can provide the opportunity for regulators
to look at the actual care delivered to patients rather than merely at a
facility's theoretical capacity to provide the care. In fact, it was the
recognition of this critical flaw in the extant nursing home quality of
care enforcement system that led the Office of Nursing Home Affairs to
84. See, e.g., DEP'T HEW, THE PACE PROGRAM FOR LONG-TERM CARE (1978).
85. Numerous other systems have been developed. Since they derive primarily from the
same base, however, they are quite similar. See, e.g., COLORADO DEP'T OF HEALTH, VITAL STA-
TISTICS DIVISION, LONG-TERM CARE PATIENT EVALUATION ABSTRACT (1975); DUKE UNIV.
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF AGING AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, MULTIDIMENSIONAL FUNC-
TIONAL ASSESSMENTS: THE OARS METHODOLOGY (1975).
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develop PACE.86 This system can also form the basis for reimbursing
facilities according to resident outcomes.87
A prerequisite to an outcome-oriented system is the definition of
the expected changes in patient status that should occur at various
points in time if appropriate health care is provided. Similarly, the
structure and process standards that are currently being employed
should be sufficiently well-defined and should avoid the open-ended
and imprecise terms currently contained in the Conditions of Participa-
tion. While it is appropriate that state agencies or HEW have the dis-
cretion to establish standards, that discretion should be exercised to
circumscribe the discretion of individual surveyors by avoiding the use
of such vague and subjective terms as "adequate," "qualified" and
"sufficient" that fill the current federal standards" but are difficult to
enforce.89 Neither facilities nor surveyors can be completely sure of
their meaning. It is difficult to prosecute enforcement actions with
vague standards; administrative bodies and courts are not comfortable
with state agency application of ill-defined standards that leave great
discretion to surveyors, and surveyors themselves prefer specific stan-
dards that they can apply with confidence. On the other hand, imposi-
tion of highly specific and detailed standards leads to the charge of
bureaucratic nitpicking, harassment and undue government interfer-
ence with facility management.90 Although detailed standards are eas-
ier to enforce and, by minimizing the exercise of surveyor judgment,
assure uniform and objective enforcement in agencies with several sur-
veyors,9 ' establishing management, personnel and patient care policies
may stifle facility innovation and creativity.92
Because current federal and state standards (most of which are
patterned after the federal Conditions) do not focus on whether the
needs of individual residents are being fulfilled, they do not assure
86. See generally IMPROVEMENT STUDY, supra note 14.
87. See notes 133-40 and accompanying text infra.
88. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.1124, .1125(a), .1 126, .1126(a), .1130, .1130(b), .113 1(a)-(b),
.1135(c) (1977).
89. NAAG REP., supra note 64, at 34; see Levine v. Whalen, 39 N.Y.2d 510, 349 N.E.2d 820,
384 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1976).
90. See Brown, An Appraisal ofthe Nursing Home Enforcement Process, 17 ARIz. L. REV.
304, 316 (1975).
91. Nursing homes in Colorado frequently allege that different surveyors are inconsistent in
finding deficiencies in the same facilities. This often justified criticism results from the broad
discretion left to each surveyor by state and federal standards.
92. The debate over the extent of detail in which the government should set standards will




quality of resident care. The solution to this problem is resident-fo-
cused standards, such as outcome standards, but few currently exist.
New measures of quality of nursing home care and new enforcement
techniques for surveyors to use in applying them must be developed. 93-
Changing the standards to a resident orientation and enhancing survey
capacity with different professional skills, such as resident assessment,
could kindle a new spirit of dedication and energy in a regulatory
agency staff that could lead, at least for a time, to improved enforce-
ment activity and begin another regulatory life-cycle.9 4
C Economic Incentives for the Provision of Quaity Care
Because most nursing homes are proprietary, most nursing home
owners are motivated primarily by a concern for maximization of prof-
its rather than residents' welfare. It would thus seem possible to im-
prove the quality of nursing home care through economic incentives,
such as rewards for good care or financial penalties for poor care, en-
couraging competition within regulatory guidelines. It must, of course,
be recognized that while adequate reimbursement is a prerequisite to
quality care, and while reimbursement can be designed to furnish in-
centives for facilities to provide good care, it cannot guarantee that the
care will be provided,95 just as establishing structual standards that ex-
amine a facility's theoretical capacity to provide quality care does not
ensure its actual delivery. Thus, even if reimbursement is high enough
to cover the actual costs of quality care, a means to examine the process
or outcome of care must be tied to reimbursement to assure that care is
appropriately delivered.
Before discussing reimbursement policies, however, it is necessary
to highlight briefly the primary characteristics of nursing home financ-
ing and economic behavior and then to examine alternative means of
reimbursement and their effect on facility conduct regarding resident
care.
1. Nursing Home Financing
The nursing home industry, most of which is proprietary,96 is capi-
93. See IMPROVEMENT STUDY, supra note 14, at 14-15.
94. See notes 52-60 supra.
95. OHIo REP., supra note 6, at 9.
96. The nursing home industry grew from 7000 nursing care homes in 1954 to 9500 in 1960,
12,000 in 1965, F. Moss & V. HALAMANDARIS, supra note 2, at 7, and 18,000 in 1976, NATIONAL
CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, MASTER FACILITY INVENTORY 15 (1976). At present, 93% are
privately owned and 75% of those are proprietary. Kane & Kane, supra note 29, at 814 (Table 2).
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tal-intensive, generating lower annual revenues than would otherwise
be generated by the capital used by the industry.97 Profit from the
nursing home industry as a whole is generally lower than that in other
businesses-about four percent in 1976.98 The industry, however, is at-
tractive to investors not because of its profits, but because of its poten-
tial for cash flow. Because the primary capital investment in the
nursing home business is real estate, and because Medicaid and Medi-
care generously reimburse depreciation (a non-cash flow item), if
amortization of debt-financed principal is less than depreciation ex-
pense, nursing homes generate cash flow at the rate of about thirty
cents per dollar invested.99
Because a higher net cash flow, the principal factor in the attrac-
tion of capital to the nursing home industry, is based primarily on
larger depreciation deductions, it is clear that nursing home owners will
seek to maximize their depreciable basis (by transferring a facility to
increase its tax basis) and to maintain revenue sufficient to cover mort-
gage payments in order to assure a tax-sheltered cash flow by either
maximizing income or minimizing expenses. An owner can maximize
income by attempting to increase Medicaid and private pay rates (al-
though the owner may have little actual control over them) and by
maintaining high occupancy rates in his facilities. The owner, how-
ever, has far more control over operating expenses, such as those for
labor, food and patient care services. Because these costs directly or
indirectly affect patient care in nursing homes, the means of nursing
home financing of and reimbursement for these items have obvious im-
plications for quality of care. 1°°
By comparison, of the 6500 hospitals in the United States, only 13% are proprietary. Id. Since
1967, the nursing home industry has been "big business"; many facilities are owned by national
chains and are publicly traded on the major stock exchanges. Shulman & Galanter, Reorganizing
the Nursing Home Industry." A Proposal, 10 MILBANK MEM. FUND Q. 129 (1976). Although cut-
backs in Medicare reimbursement in 1967-68 caused a sharp decline in proprietary nursing home
profits, Butler, An Advocate's Guide to the Medicare Program, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 831, 837
(1975), the industry continues to enjoy a substantial profit margin and is an attractive investment,
F. Moss & V. HALAMANDARIS, supra note 2, at 73-101. One hundred proprietary chains control
one-fifth of the nursing home beds in the United States; the largest of these operates 121 facilities
with over 20,000 beds and had gross revenue in 1976 exceeding $97 million. See Dole, An Investi.
gation into the Business of Caringfor the Elderly, 23 NURSING HOMEs 2 (1979).
97. Shulman & Galanter, supra note 96, at 134 (1976). See also F. Moss & V. HALA-
MANDARIS, supra note 2, at 73-85.
98. Shulman & Galanter, supra note 96, at 135.
99. Id. at 134-37.
100. Id. at 137-38. The authors propose government ownership of nursing home real estate
and private management contracts for providing patient care services as one means of shifting
incentives for profit maximization away from diverting resources to cover capital and toward ap-
plying resources to patient care costs. They suggest that management contracts could be
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While some commentators attribute nursing home quality of care
problems to the profit-making status of the facilities and suggest that a
solution is to mandate that nursing homes be only not-for-profit enti-
ties, evidence generally shows that nonprofit homes do not provide a
higher quality of care than proprietary facilities. 101 Moreover, the prin-
cipals in a nonprofit corporation may obtain significant compensation
by providing goods and services (often at inflated rates) to the corpora-
tion, by selling or leasing, and, of course, by the same fraudulent prac-
tices engaged in by some owners of profit-making entities. Since
nonprofit nursing homes are exempt from property and other local
taxes, they can be highly "profitable" enterprises. Although state tax-
ing authorities are empowered to disqualify nonprofit corporations that
actually generate profits, neither they nor state licensing agencies set
standards for accounting, purchasing, compensation or investment
practices of nursing homes.1"2 There is thus no means of assuring that
nonprofit facilities return income to patient care services instead of to
the pockets of principals, who are essentially their owners. Those non-
profit nursing homes that provide a high quality of care to their resi-
dents do so because of the dedication, commitment and beneficent
motivations of their managers and employees. The absence of a need
to generate profits for owners may certainly support these motivations,
but it in no way guarantees their existence.
2. Reimbursement Approaches Under Medicaid and Medicare 0
3
Before the 1972 Social Security amendments provision requiring
Medicaid to reimburse SNFs and ICFs on a "reasonable-cost-related
basis,"t°4 states used a variety of methods for nursing home reimburse-
negotiated periodically on a competitive bid basis. The authors argue that such a system would
provide greater control over quality by providing time-limited, non-vested agreements, public ac-
countability for contract performance, and competitor scrutiny of cost and quality. Id. at 139-42.
101. See M. MENDELSON, TENDER LOVING GREED 195-212 (1974). See also ACTION COALI-
TION OF ELDERS, KANE HOSPITAL: A PLACE TO DIE (1975). Experience in California with pre-
paid health plans (organized providers of health care who contracted with the state Medicaid
agency to serve Medicaid beneficiaries) demonstrated that not-for-profit entities actually generate
profits that were hidden through deceptive or fraudulent accounting practices and provided a
generally poor quality of health care service. S. REP. No. 95-749, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-12 (1978).
102. Federal regulations on Medicaid nursing home reimbursement, however, now prohibit
costs of services furnished to "related organizations" exceeding the market price of the services.
43 Fed. Reg. 45,259 (1978) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 447.284 (a)).
103. For an extensive overview of nursing home reimbursement, see Coleman & Schneider,
An Advocate's Guide to Nursing Home Reimbursement (1979) (available from the National Health
Law Program, 2401 Main Street, Santa Monica, Calif. 90405).
104. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 246, 86 Stat. 1426 (1972)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(E) (1976)).
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ment. Some paid on a flat rate, usually differentiating between SNFs
and ICFs. Others paid on a cost-plus basis, paying all costs plus a fac-
tor for profit; among the latter reimbursement systems were variations
including cost reimbursement up to a ceiling and costs up to a ceiling
plus a profit factor. Medicare reimburses nursing homes on the basis of
"reasonable cost," 0 5 which amounts to full payment for most facility
costs, without a ceiling, plus a profit factor computed as a reasonable
return on net invested equity, currently set at 10.5 percent.'
0 6
Different reimbursement mechanisms provide incentives for differ-
ent economic behavior, produce different regulatory atmospheres, and
can advance different social goals. Flat rates, for instance, create incen-
tives for facilities to reduce variable costs (which will likely be those
costs attributable to patient care) in order to maximize profits; such a
system does tend to hold down costs of care as well as the expenses of
administration and produces more budget predictability for the paying
agency. It may produce poor quality care, however, and to the extent
that the rate is seen as unduly low, facilities will discriminate against
publicly financed patients. 7
A cost-plus reimbursement system under which states pay "allow-
able costs" is inherently inflationary and contains no incentives for effi-
ciency, although it also provides no disincentives for quality care as
long as states cover all patient care costs. It is more expensive to ad-
minister, since cost reports must be audited. Some facilities have in-
flated their allowable costs by sale and leaseback arrangements,
excessive interest payments, inflated initial costs, and refinancing to
minimize their own invested equity and maximize the rate of return.0 8
Furthermore, determination of what costs are allowable is politically
sensitive and difficult. To curb the inflationary impact of cost reim-
bursement, some states have imposed ceilings beyond which they will
not reimburse. Under this approach, high cost institutions whose costs
exceed the ceiling will behave as if they were reimbursed on a flat rate;
for lower cost homes the system resembles cost reimbursement and pro-
vides an incentive for them to increase costs over time up to the ceiling.
105. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395(0, (p) (1976).
106. Id. § 1395(x)(v)(I)(B) (1976); 42 C.F.R. § 405.429 (1978); [1977] 1 MEDICARE & MEDI-
CAID GUIDE (CCH) 1 5782.
107. Minnesota law prohibits nursing homes from charging private patients over 10% more
than Medicaid patients. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256B.48 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). This statute is
being challenged by the industry in Minnesota Ass'n of Health Care Facilities v. Perpich, No. 377-
CN-467 (D. Minn., filed Oct. 15, 1977).
108. See F. Moss & V. HALAMANDARIS, supra note 2, at 90-100, for a discussion of some
common means of profiteering.
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The costs of administration and audit are similar to those under a cost
system, but the state is protected from unchecked strains on its budget.
The placement of the ceiling in this method is critical to determining
whether patient care suffers. If the ceiling merely penalizes inefficient
homes it might not adversely affect patient care; however, a ceiling
placed too low may jeopardize care to patients.
States may also pay costs up to a ceiling plus an additional profit
factor beyond the ceiling, calculated as a return on the owner's net in-
vested equity.'0 9 Payment of profit based on net invested equity (the
Medicare method) is viewed as a means of encouraging more personal
investment in a facility (as opposed to using borrowed funds for capi-
tal) on the theory that if one has invested his own money in a business
he will be more likely to safeguard its reputation and provide a higher
quality of care for patients. While this method may thus provide a
greater incentive than the other two cost-plus mechanisms, it does not
relate profit directly to a facility's quality of care, but rather assumes
that quality will accompany return on an owner's personal investment,
an assumption of very questionable validity.
Federal Medicaid regulations issued to implement the new cost-
related nursing home reimbursement requirement of the 1972 Social
Security amendments" 0 indicate that flat rates (which would not be
cost-related) and cost reimbursement without a ceiling are not accepta-
ble."'I Furthermore, states are not required to provide a profit." 2 In
no event may rates exceed those paid under Medicare, 13 but they must
be high enough to cover "actual allowable costs of a facility that is
economically and efficiently operated, t 14 including the costs of meet-
ing state licensing and federal certification requirements 1 5 and of rou-
tine services (room and board, nursing care, medical supplies and
equipment)."16 The regulations permit states to provide incentives to
participating facilities to upgrade the quality of care through
reimbursement." 17
109. 43 Fed. Reg. 4862 (1978).
110. 42 C.F.R. § 447.272-.316 (1978).
111. 43 Fed. Reg. 4863 (1978).
112. Id. 4862-63.
113. 42 C.F.R. § 447.316. (1978). Rates set prospectively may be effectively higher than Medi-
care rates. Id. § 447.306(b).
114. Id. § 447.302(b); see Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n v. Califano, 465 F. Supp. 605 (M.D.
Ala. 1979).
115. Id. § 447.279.
116. Id.§447.281.
117. Id. § 447-306.
1979] 1341
NORTH CA4ROLIN, L4WREVIEW
Traditionally, under Medicaid and Medicare, health care institu-
tions that are paid on a cost basis, which includes hospitals under both
programs as well as Medicare nursing homes, are periodically reim-
bursed at an estimated rate during the accounting period (usually a
fiscal year), after which the facilities account for their allowable costs
and the paying agency adjusts the rate upward or downward. Such a
retrospective system is inflationary. To curb health care cost inflation,
the federal government under Medicare and the state Medicaid agen-
cies are experimenting with prospective reimbursement, in which rates
are set in advance and no adjustment is made to reflect actual costs
incurred."' While this approach permits states to budget accurately
and may save the administrative cost of auditing facilities, it has the
serious disadvantage of promoting discrimination against publicly
financed patients if a facility feels that its rate does not reflect true cost.
3. Reimbursement as a Quality Assurance Device
Several mechanisms have been proposed or are being used to em-
ploy the leverage of Medicaid reimbursement as a means of regulating
quality of care for publicly supported residents.' 19 Some, such as the
system used in Illinois, are based on process measures, but most are
based on the structural standards of the federal Conditions of Partici-
pation. A necessary prerequisite to any such quality enforcement sys-
tem is, of course, established standards that can form the basis for
reimbursement.
The state of Michigan, which had paid nursing homes on a flat
rate and then on the basis of costs up to a ceiling, adopted a penalty
system related to reimbursement after two studies showed that the
state's nursing homes averaged a forty percent return on net invested
equity, 20 four times the Medicare allowable rate and over three times
the "normal" rate accepted in the investment community. The Michi-
gan system now pays costs plus a $1.25 per patient per day profit factor
up to a ceiling. If a facility fails to comply with any of the eighteen
Medicaid-Medicare Conditions of Participation, the facility's profit fac-
tor is reduced according to a point system with the maximum reduction
being one dollar per patient per day. The system has several flaws.
Because the penalty comes from profit rather than variable costs, pre-
118. These are the demonstration projects authorized under the Social Security Amendments
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 222(a), 86 Stat. 1390 (1972).
119. See note 141 infra.
120. See generaly Coleman & Schneider, supra note 103.
[Vol. 571342
NURSING HOMES
sumably patient care does not suffer. But because the penalty comes
from profit that is only available under the system to facilities whose
costs fall below the ceiling, a facility can avoid being penalized by be-
coming inefficient, that is, raising costs above the ceiling. 2' Whether
the penalty really comes from profit depends upon the accuracy and
detail of the audits that safeguard against owners and operators with-
drawing funds from patient care sources. Another problem with the
system is its dependence upon the federal Conditions of Participation
as indicators of quality of care. As discussed above, most of the Condi-
tions merely examine the capability of the facility to provide care
rather than the care actually provided. Tying penalties to the Condi-
tions, rather than to their component standards or elements, also raises
the problem that there may be serious violations of some standards that
do not, in the surveyors' judgment, amount to violations of the entire
Condition, and hence will not trigger application of the penalty. In
addition, enforcement personnel may be reluctant to find noncompli-
ance with Conditions knowing that financial penalties will attach.'
22
Another potential problem with this approach is that if providers assert
the right to contest the surveyors' judgments regarding compliance with
standards, the entire reimbursement system can become mired in
lengthy administrative and judicial proceedings.
The state of Illinois adopted a different approach, paying three
types of costs: capital costs up to a maximum, nursing costs at a fiat
rate, and support (administrative, dietary and maintenance) costs at the
level of the fiftieth percentile of all homes in various geographic re-
gions. Homes falling below the fiftieth percentile of support costs could
keep half of the difference as an incentive profit; those above the fiftieth
percentile received none.'2 3 In addition, the state would pay nursing
homes according to a "point count system." Patients were assessed,
and, based on their conditions, the state determined the types of nurs-
ing care or rehabilitative services that should be provided. Homes were
then paid according to the "point" assigned to each of these services
and the state would survey to determine whether the services were ac-
tually rendered. While this system does encourage facilities to accept
and treat higher risk patients with greater needs, it creates the perverse
incentive for facilities to maintain patients at their sickest in order to
121. See id.
122. This behavior has been noted in other penalty systems. See notes 223-24 and accompa-
nying text infra.
123. ILL. DEP'T OF PUBLIC AID RULES §§ 4.142, .144(d) (1977).
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maximize profits, and creates no incentive for facilities to rehabilitate
or assist patients in achieving their maximum potential for indepen-
dence or self-care. It also raises the question of what services in a nurs-
ing home should be routinely available to everyone in the facility and
what services are really "extra."'
124
The Massachusetts Rate Commission proposed another quality-re-
lated nursing home reimbursement scheme that would pay a thirty cent
per patient per day bonus for facilities achieving a high quality score.
To receive the bonus a facility must have a composite score of ninety-
five or more on the 541 items found on the federal SNF survey form, be
above average on the nursing, medical and social services components
of the state's Medical Review program, have no pending enforcement
actions against it, be within the range of normal nursing and variable
cost screens, and be above average in Medicaid patient census levels. 125
While such a system would overcome the incentive for facilities to keep
patients disabled and debilitated, as in the Illinois scheme, it still relies
on the federal Conditions of Participation as its quality indicators and
on the validity and reliability of the actual weighting of the 541 quality
indicators. 126
New York has also developed a reimbursement system tied to
quality of care. Facilities are grouped according to bed size, geo-
graphic location and whether they are SNFs or ICFs. Facilities are
rated according to their scores on state licensing standards for nursing
service, dietary service, housekeeping service, social work, and activi-
ties, and according to their scores on the medical review of resident
conditions by state officials. 127 Based on these scores, the state ranks
facilities as "very good," "satisfactory" or "needs improvement."' 128
Costs of each of the five services noted above plus administrative costs
are averaged for each of the three categories. The state computes a
ceiling for the "satisfactory" category at the group's weighted average,
and computes ceilings for "very good" and "needs improvement" at
124. The State of Utah proposed a similar system to provide incentive reimbursement accord-
ing to nursing home patients' needs. The system was apparently approved by HEW but never
implemented. See Utah Long-Term Care Payments System (Feb. 1976) (available from Bruce
Walter, Utah State Division of Health, Medical Care & Facilities Branch, Salt Lake City, Utah
84110).
125. 114.2 CODE OF MASS. REGULATIONS § 2.16 (1977).
126. The weights were assigned by subjective judgments of a group of surveyors. The state's
own estimates were that over one-fourth of facilities qualifying for the incentive would not actu-
ally deserve it. See CONSUMER HEALTH ADVOCACY PROGRAM OF MASSACHUSETTS, MEMORAN-
DUM FOR THE RATE SETTING COMMISSION 4-8 (1978).




110 percent and 90 percent of the "satisfactory" cost ceiling or at the
group's average, whichever is higher. 129 In addition to paying for capi-
tal costs, depreciation, interest expense and return on net invested eq-
uity,130 the state reimburses each facility at the rate of the lower of its
actual costs for the six items mentioned above or the ceilings on costs
attributable to the facility's rating category.
Since the ceiling on reimbursement for any facility is the lower of
its actual cost or the group's actual cost, it is questionable whether this
system provides a meaningful incentive to achieve a "very good" score.
An advantage to the system, however, is that the New York quality
indicators are more precise and certainly more patient-focused than the
federal Conditions of Participation. 3' It has been observed, however,
that the rating system is so strict that, of 550 nursing homes in the state,
only 4 or 5 qualify as "very good," and the value of the "incentive"
system is greatly diminished.
3 2
A reimbursement approach could create more appropriate incen-
tives for facilities to improve patient care, rather than to maintain pa-
tient dependence, if it were based upon the outcome of care rather than
the care process. 133 No states have yet developed such a system, al-
though research directed to this end is under way. 34 Nor has HEW
met its primary responsibility for quality enforcement by developing
such a reimbursement scheme. An obstacle to the implementation of
an outcome reimbursement system is the lack of clearly defined and
statistically valid outcome measures for long-term care that would al-
low judgment of facility performance 35 and reimbursement through a
bonus for patients achieving expected outcomes or a penalty for pa-
tients failing to achieve them. The scheme would depend upon a sys-
tem of patient assessment performed regularly by facilities and audited
129. 10 N.Y. CODE OF RULES AND REGULATIONS § 86-2.11 (1978).
130. Id § 86-2.19-.28.
131. New York regulations also permit facilities to seek exemption from these rates for aberra-
tions in services, patient mix, and lengths of stay by state departmental "management assessment
reviews." Id. § 86-2.14(a)(17). The rules also permit the state to penalize facilities for poor quali-
ty of care. Id. § 86-2.14(0.
132. Interview with Phil Gassel, Legal Services for the Elderly Poor, 1095 Broadway, New
York, N.Y. (Dec. 17, 1978).
133. For a proposal to develop such a system, see Ruchlin, Levey & Muller, The Long-Term
Care Marketplace: An Analysis of Deficiencies and Potential Reform by Means of Incentive Reim-
bursement, 13 MED. CARE 979 (1975).
134. See, e.g., CENTER FOR HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH, UNIV. OF COLORADO MED.
CENTER, LONG-TERM CARE REIMBURSEMENT AND REGULATION: A STUDY OF COST, CASE MIX
AND QUALITY (1978) (continuing study funded by the Health Care Financing Administration,
HEW, in December 1978 for a three-year period).
135. See note 80 and accompanying text supra.
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by the state agency. As noted above, 13 6 the technology for this assess-
ment exists and could be rapidly put into place. 137 Patients would be
grouped according to their conditions or status, and their progress,
maintenance or regress would be measured according to key health sta-
tus indicators. The average progress, maintenance or regress of each
group at each assessment would be summed to create a facility health
status profile that could be compared to an absolute standard (when
one could be developed) or to the relative performance of other
facilities.
Such an assessment and reimbursement system could reveal the
ability of a facility to provide the types of services that its residents
need to improve or maintain their health. It requires a sophisticated
model to be developed, including the choice of key health status indica-
tors, the weight to be accorded each one, the size and nature of patient
groupings, and the choice of an equitable bonus or penalty mechanism.
Because the system could be abused through fraud, the state agency
would have to establish a thorough and sensitive monitoring system to
assure accurate information about patient status. The system would
create an incentive for selection of only easily remediable patients un-
less it prohibits that discrimination and/or includes as an acceptable
outcome an individual's maintenance of status in addition to improve-
ment in status. Furthermore, it must accommodate patients who will
not achieve expected outcomes despite the best and most dedicated ef-
forts of facility staff; this safeguard could occur through the averaging
process or a more complicated system that would examine inputs of
care for those persons not achieving expected outcomes and not penal-
ize the facility if it had provided appropriate care. 138
While it would be more complex than the current regulatory pro-
gram, an outcome reimbursement system could eliminate many of the
present structural standards that are irrelevant to patient care.' 39 In
addition, the system appears to create the most appropriate incentives
for a facility to provide high quality care-at least care designed to
improve or maintain resident status. In view of the complexities of de-
veloping and implementing such a system, it is not an immediately at-
tainable goal; it is, however, one toward which HEW and state
136. See notes 84-87 and accompanying text supra.
137. See Memorandum to Massachusetts Rate Setting Commission from Paul Denson and
Ellen Jones, Harvard Center for Community Health and Medical Care (December 12, 1978).
138. See note 81 and accompanying text supra.
139. See notes 80-83 and accompanying text supra.
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Medicaid agencies should strive (by, for instance, implementing
mandatory resident assessment by all facilities) while developing other
reimbursement systems to use the competitive behavior of proprietary
facilities to provide incentives for high quality of care.1
40
D. Improving Enforcement Mechanisms
1. Practical Enforcement Problems
Were patient-focused standards properly designed and outcome
reimbursement in place today, regulators might not need additional en-
forcement remedies to ensure provision of high quality care to publicly
supported residents of nursing homes.14 ' Until those programs are de-
veloped, however, state agencies will need a broad array of enforce-
ment remedies, tailored to the seriousness of violations, with which to
enforce quality standards. Prior to the recent enactment of legislation
to permit enforcement mechanisms in some states, the only remedies
for violations of state licensing or Medicaid certification standards were
license revocation, refusal to renew the annual Medicaid contract, 142 or
decertification during the contract term. Such exclusive remedies are
difficult to enforce because facilities demand lengthy administrative
hearings and because closing a facility and moving its residents can
often have serious consequences.
Licenses are viewed legally as property that cannot be revoked
without due process-usually timely and adequate notice and a full
hearing on the charges before revocation. 143 Courts also view ongoing
Medicaid participation during the annual contract term as a property
right subject to the same procedural protections. 44 It might appear
that a state's refusal to renew a Medicaid contract (as opposed to termi-
nation of the contract during the period) involves no property right,
since the facility has no right to expect a renewal of its Medicaid partic-
ipation agreement. Some courts have analyzed the contract situation in
140. See, e.g., Shulman & Galanter, supra note 96.
141. Privately supported residents (about 38% of all nursing home residents) would be aided
directly by resident-oriented state licensing standards and indirectly by Medicaid quality-oriented
reimbursement policies, which should improve overall facility care. Arguably, even with im-
proved reimbursement policies, some of the state enforcement remedies discussed in notes 142-289
and accompanying text infra would be necessary to protect non-publicly supported nursing home
residents.
142. Under certain circumstances, agencies can execute short-term contracts with Medicaid
and Medicare nursing homes, but this authority is limited. See notes 39-40 supra.
143. See CoLo. REv. STAT. § 24-4-104 (Cum. Supp. 1978)
144. See, e.g., Shady Acres Nursing Home, Inc. v. Canary, 39 Ohio App. 2d 47, 316 N.E.2d
481 (1973).
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this manner, holding that no pretermination hearing is constitutionally
required.145 The Second and Seventh Circuits, however, have tended
to find a property right in the "expectancy interest" of a facility that its
contract would be renewed and have required notice and hearing
before a state may refuse to renew a Medicaid participation agree-
ment." 6 Pending that hearing, these courts have ordered state agencies
to continue to pay the facilities for their Medicaid residents regardless
of the availability of federal funds for those patients.'
47
The Second Circuit, in Case v. Weinberger,18 followed the
Supreme Court's direction in Weinberger v. Saf' 14 9 in determining the
type of hearing that must be provided to the facility to satisfy due proc-
ess. The court of appeals balanced the government's interest in the
health and safety of the nursing home patients against the facility's
need for some type of adequate review mechanism in regard to reim-
bursement and determined that the informal discussions between the
facility owner and the government authorities, combined with the op-
portunity of a full-scale post-contract evidentiary hearing, provided
due process protection against arbitrary government action.'5 0 The
court also acknowledged the legitimacy of a state agency's summary
revocation or refusal to renew a contract in emergencies that seriously
threaten patient safety, and noted that a later hearing would satisfy due
process under those circumstances.' 5' Thus, both the court's holding
and its dictum render a desirable result.
Facilities sometimes invoke the rights of their patients not to be
moved without a hearing,' 52 a legitimate concern if the state Medicaid
145. See, e.g., Paramount Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Department of Health Care Services,
15 Cal. 3d 489, 542 P.2d 1, 125 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1975); Convalescent Care Center, Inc. v. Bates, 44
U.S.L.W. 3539 (Franklin County Ct. App., May 15, 1975), cerl. denied, 425 U.S. 952 (1976); Shady
Acres Nursing Home, Inc. v. Canary, 39 Ohio App. 2d 47, 316 N.E.2d 481 (1973).
146. In Case v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1975), and Hathaway v. Matthews, 546 F.2d
227 (7th Cir. 1976), the courts found a property right in the expectancy interest of renewal of the
Medicaid provider agreement. Despite the language of these holdings, however, it is unclear from
the facts of those cases whether they did indeed involve a refusal to renew or a decision to termi-
nate a Medicaid contract during its term. In Case the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
said that HEW determined that the facility would "no longer be certified" as a Medicaid provider.
523 F.2d at 605. In Hathaway, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit indicated that the
home received a one-year Medicaid contract in December 1975 and was notified in March 1976
that payment would be terminated for violations of state licensing standards. 546 F.2d at 228.
147. See, e.g., Hathaway v. Mathews, 546 F.2d 227, 232 (1976).
148. 523 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1975).
149. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
150. 523 F.2d at 607-11. See also Schwartzberg v. Califano, 453 F. Supp. 1042 (S.D.N.Y.
1978).
151. 523 F.2d at 606.
152. See, e.g., Schwartzberg v. Califano, 453 F. Supp. 1042, 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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agency is threatening to terminate a Medicaid beneficiary's eligibility
for services on the ground that the services are not medically neces-
sary.153 But when the facility is subject to closure for failure to meet
licensing or certification standards, one must be suspicious of a facil-
ity's motives when it invokes the threat to patient safety from transfers
out of the closed facility. While the danger of transfer trauma is quite
real, 154 and a period of time for "transfer planning" must be afforded to
residents in all but emergency cases, one must carefully weigh the rela-
tive harm from transfer against that of remaining in an umsafe institu-
tion, recognizing that many violations of standards do not actually
jeopardize patient safety. These lines are difficult to draw, but some
courts have grappled with them. 5' Even the actual presence of benefi-
ciaries as intervenors in cases in which facilities challenge government
revocation of licensure or certification 156 does not assure that nursing
home residents' interests are completely protected, because neither the
residents themselves nor their representatives can fully appreciate what
is in their best interest when faced with the untenable choice between
moving or remaining in a substandard facility that threatens their
lives. 157
States face a peculiar dilemma in all certification cases. Federal
law prohibits the continuation of federal funds under Medicaid for
more than thirty days after a decision to revoke a certification.' 58 Thus,
the state itself may be required to pay for care in a facility for an indefi-
nite period of time pending legal proceedings, even if the facility poses
a serious threat to patient life or safety.' 59 This substantial state ex-
pense in time and money, coupled with the severe dilemma posed by
153. All suits by Medicaid beneficiaries challenging the termination of medical eligibility
without prior hearings when termination resulted in transfers out of nursing facilities have been
successful. See, e.g., Feld v. Berger, 424 F. Supp. 1356 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
154. See notes 164-66 and accompanying text infra.
155. See, e.g., Schwartzberg v. Califano, 453 F. Supp. 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
156. See, e.g., Caton Ridge Nursing Home, Inc. v. Califano, 447 F. Supp. 1222 (D. Md. 1978);
Klein v. Mathews, 430 F. Supp. 1005 (D.N.J. 1977), ag'dsub nora. Klein v. Califano, 586 F.2d 250
(3d Cir. 1978); Kane v. Perry, 82 Misc. 2d 1019, 371 N.Y.S. 2d 605 (Sup. Ct. 1975), rep'd, 55 App.
Div. 2d 678, 390 N.Y.S. 2d 191 (1976).
157. See note 164 infra.
158. 43 Fed. Reg. 45,234 (1978) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 442.15(c)). Such a deprivation
seems unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court has held that states have no due process rights
because they are not "persons" within the meaning of the fifth amendment. South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). States may contest HE Ws refusal to reimburse costs of nursing
home services in a decertified home, under 42 U.S.C. § 1316 (1976). See Klein v. Mathews, 430 F.
Supp. 1005, 1006 n.2, 1008 n.8 (D.N.J. 1977). Furthermore, facilities such as Town Court Nursing
Home masquerade as resident representatives. Town Court Nursing Center, Inc. v. Beal, 586 F.
2d 280 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3683 (1979).
159. See OHIo REP., supra note 6, at 26-27.
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the inhumane position of leaving patients in a facility that actually
threatens their lives or health and the potential danger of moving them,
immobilizes agencies and deters invocation of decertification or license
revocation except in extreme circumstances.
In a license or certification revocation situation a pretermination
hearing is clearly required by the Constitution and most state laws, un-
less there is an immediate threat to patient health and safety, in which
case summary revocation is usually permissible. 6 ' These license revo-
cation proceedings, however, are costly and time consuming. 16  Fur-
thermore, license revocation and Medicaid decertification is a drastic
step that, if successful, eventually results in the closing of the facility
and the moving of its residents. Other than acting as a possible deter-
rent to other facilities violating the law, it is not a means of improving
the quality of life or health in institutions. Moving residents causes at
least three serious problems. First, in communities without alternative
beds, residents may be moved far from families and friends. 162 Since
visits by relatives and friends not only are desired by nursing home
residents, but are arguably a quality enforcement tool, 63 they should
be encouraged rather than discouraged. Second, closing a facility may
also pose a problem in urban areas where there is an insufficient
number of nursing home beds to accept residents moving from a closed
home. Finally, resident relocation may cause the phenomenon known
as "transfer shock" or "transfer trauma."' 6 Many nursing home resi-
160. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-104 (Cum. Supp. 1978). But see Ross v. Wisconsin
Dep't of Health & Social Services, 369 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (invalidating a state statute
permitting emergency moving of patients from facilities that violated state health and safety
standards).
161. For example, the attempt to revoke the license and Medicaid certification of a nursing
home in Colorado involved an administrative hearing of 20 days, 4000 pages of testimony and
exhibits, over $I0,000 in legal expenses, and more than a year's delay in final agency action. See
In re Geriatrics, Inc., Colorado Dep't of Health Action No. H-77-01 (1977). Since the facility is
currently seeking judicial review of the state's order, the process will be more costly and further
delayed before the matter is finally settled.
162. This is especially a problem in rural areas such as the southern Colorado region served by
Geriatrics, Inc., see note 161 supra, which was the only nursing home over sixty miles of moun-
tainous terrain.
163. See note 356 and accompanying text infra.
164. Aldrich & Mendkoff, Relocation of the Aged and Disabled- A Mortality Study, I I J. AM.
GERIATRICS SOC'Y 185 (1963); Blenker, Environmental Change and the Aging Individual, 7 GER-
ONTOLOGIST 101 (1967); Kasl, Physical and Mental Health Effects ofInvoluntary Relocation and
Institutionalization of the Elderly: A Review, 62 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 377 (1972); Kastler, Gray &
Carruth, Involuntary Relocation of the Elderly, 8 GERONTOLOGIST 276 (1968); Killian, Effect of
Geriatric Transfers on Mortality Rates, 15 SOCIAL WORK 19 (1970); Kral, Grad & Berenson, Stress
Reactions Resultingfrom the Relocation of an Aging Population, 13 CAN. PSYCH. A.J. 201 (1968);
Smith & Brand, Effects of Enforced Relocation on Life Adjustment in a Nursing Home, 6 INT'L J.
AGING & HUMAN DEV. 249 (1975).
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dents, especially those who are incompetent or disoriented, develop a
physical, psychological and emotional dependence upon their sur-
roundings. This usually happens within six months of admission to a
nursing home when the expected stay is indefinite, and the reliance is
so complete that any move, whether to another room in the facility or
to a second facility, can cause serious emotional and psychological
damage, physical stress, and a dramatic increase in the rate of mortal-
ity. The serious potential for transfer trauma has given rise to constitu-
tional challenges to individual or group transfers from nursing
homes.' 6- The potential for irreparable injury under these circum-
stances usually compels courts to grant temporary injunctive relief.166
The threat of transfer trauma in moving an individual or an entire pop-
ulation from a nursing home has spurred the development of "transfer
planning" regulations and programs designed to protect persons from
the dangers of relocation, including advance notice, counseling and pa-
tient preparation. 67 Courts have recognized that when the facility it-
self poses an immediate threat to patient life or safety, when the
provider itself decides to terminate Medicaid participation, and when
there is no expectation of continued residence in the home (because, for
instance, the provider agreement is time limited), the balance between
the state's interest in closing the facility expeditiously and the potential
of transfer trauma to the residents tips in favor of the state.'
68
In view of the problems of time, expense, lack of available beds,
transfer trauma and political pressure, it is not surprising that few states
have ever revoked a nursing home license or Medicaid certification.1
69
Enforcement of licensing standards would be greatly enhanced by the
availability of a variety of civil and criminal remedies less severe than
closure. Several states have recently enacted such remedies as receiver-
ships, fines, citations, injunctive relief, private citizen actions and the
authority to refuse to permit capital construction or facility transfers
under Certificate of Need programs. Although most of these remedies
have only recently been adopted, and experience under them is limited,
165. See note 153 supra.
166. See Klein v. Mathews, 430 F. Supp. 1005, 1008-12 (D.N.J. 1977), a 'd sub. nom. Klein v.
Califano, 586 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1978); Hathaway v. Mathews, 546 F.2d 227,231-32 (7th Cir. 1976).
167. NAAG REP., supra note 64, at 59-61.
168. Id. at 64-65 (citing Paramount Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Department of Health Care
Services, 15 Cal. 3d 489, 542 P.2d 1, 125 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1975)).
169. See F. Moss & V. HALAMANDARIS, supra note 2, at 152-61. But see Town Court Nursing
Center, Inc. v. Beal, 586 F.2d 280 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 47 U.S. L.W. 3683 (1979) (recognizing an
expectancy interest of continued residency that entitled residents to participate in the facility's
decertification hearing).
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they do offer the potential for a more appropriate and rational array of
enforcement powers for state agencies and the public, and are more
creative than the unwieldy federal remedy of decertification.
2. State Licensing Remedies
170
a. Receivership
Receivership is a traditional equitable remedy in which the court
appoints a third party to manage a party's assets in order to preserve
the property at issue in the case for ultimate disposition. 171 As noted by
the first commentator to suggest this remedy as an alternative to health
facility license revocation, "[it] would provide for a temporary takeover
of the institution, not for the sake of preserving its financial or eco-
nomic status, but rather for the sake of putting it into the kind of condi-
tion that would best serve the interests of the patients."'
' 72
The use of receiverships has been expanded by courts 73 and by
state law' 74 beyond the protection of physical property to the protection
of the civil rights of third parties.' 7- At least six states--Connecticut,
Kansas, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York and Wisconsin-have en-
acted legislation authorizing the appointment of receivers to manage
nursing homes that fail to comply with licensing standards or otherwise
jeopardize resident health and safety.' 76 In addition to these involun-
tary receiverships, facility owners can seek a voluntary receivership of a
failing business. 177 In some other states, courts have imposed receiver-
ships upon nursing homes under common law or general statutory
powers of equity.' 78
170. For an overview of current state licensing remedies, see NAT'L SENIOR CITIZENS' LAW
CENTER, NURSING HOME LAW LETTER. This monthly publication reports news of general
interest to advocates for nursing home residents and updates statutory and litigation
developments.
171. See Grad, Upgrading Health Facilities: Medical Receivershops as an Alternative to License
Revocation, 42 U. CoLo. L. REV. 419, 431-32 (1971).
172. Id. at 432.
173. See, e.g., Turner v. Goolsby, 255 F. Supp. 724 (S.D. Ga. 1965) (county school system
placed in receivership when injunction of illegal expenditure of funds to protect rights of black
students would result in irreparable injury to white students).
174. See, e.g., N.Y. MOLT. DWELL LAW § 309(4),(5) (McKinney 1974).
175. Note, Receivershio as a Remedy in Civil Rights Cases, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 115 (1969).
176. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-621a (West Cum. Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. §§ 39-926,
-931, -935, -936 (Cum. Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144A.15 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-42 (West Cum. Supp. 1977); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2862(4) (McKinney
1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 50.05 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
177. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2801(1) (McKinney 1977).
178. See, e.g., State v. Forest Manor Nursing Home, No. 77-8555-H (Dallas Dist. Court, 160th
Judicial Dist., Aug. 1977).
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All these state nursing home receivership statutes permit courts to
appoint receivers upon application of various state agencies, usually the
state health departments. None authorizes an administrative agency
itself to appoint a receiver. Although this authority seems appropriate,
at least in emergencies, 179 it would be politically difficult to enact since
it would be open to charges of conflict of interest and abuse. Expedited
judicial proceedings180 and the power to order emergency receivers ex
parte, 18 however, appear to provide necessary flexibility in the remedy,
while still protecting owners' rights.' 82 As is true with many applica-
tions for equitable judicial remedies, receivership petitions are given
priority on state court calendars and may be heard as soon as five days
after they are filed.183 While most state laws require a hearing before
imposition of a receivership, Connecticut and Wisconsin permit courts
to issue receivership orders ex parte when an emergency exists that
must be remedied immediately to ensure the health, safety and welfare
of residents.'84 Several statutes authorize the court to appoint as the
receiver either the state health director or his designee 85 or another
qualified person.'" 6
The conditions under which courts may appoint nursing home re-
ceivers vary according to the philosophy underlying the remedy.
Under New York law, for instance, the court may only appoint a re-
ceiver after the state has revoked a facility's license and the licensee has
completed administrative and judicial appeals. The receivership,
which is limited to eighteen months, is imposed to provide an opportu-
nity for the owner to sell the facility or for the orderly and protected
transition of residents to another facility.'8 7 In other states, however,
the receivership is seen as a means of improving management of the
facility to protect residents during the actual license revocation pro-
ceedings, and thus may be invoked at the commencement of a license
179. See Grad, supra note 170, at 433.
180. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § DO.05(4) (West Cum. Supp. 1978) (authorizing a court hear-
ing within five days).
181. See, e.g., id. § 50.05(5).
182. The New Jersey law significantly extends the receivership remedy by permitting a resi-
dent or his guardian to seek it. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-38 (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
183. See note 180 supra.
184. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-621b(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 50.05(5) (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
185. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144A.15(I) (West Cum. Supp. 1978); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 2810(2)(A) (McKinney 1977).
186. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-42(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
187. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2810(2)(a) (McKinney 1977).
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revocation. 88 Some state statutes go still further, permitting the state
to apply for appointment of a receiver even without initiating a license
revocation action.'89 The preamble to the New Jersey statute, for ex-
ample, states the purpose of the law to be the elimination of deficien-
cies. Thus, the state or a resident may seek a receivership upon filing a
complaint alleging that the facility is in substantial violation of the
health, safety or resident care standards of federal or state law or "any
other conditions dangerous to life, health or safety," or that the facility
habitually violates those standards. 90 Connecticut law permits appli-
cation for a receivership for the same reasons,' 9 ' but unlike the other
statutes, permits a facility owner to defeat an application for receiver-
ship if he establishes that he had no actual or constructive knowledge
of the violations, that he had insufficient time to correct them, or that
they did not exist.'9 z
Receivers under all six state laws are generally authorized to oper-
ate and manage the facility as a sound business, preserve the owners'
assets, and provide for the health, safety and welfare of residents by,
among other means, correcting or eliminating the deficiencies that gave
rise to the receiver's appointment. 193 Some laws prohibit major altera-
tions of the physical plant194 or major expenses without court con-
sent. 95 A particularly creative provision, in light of the recognized
manner in which nursing home owners make profits, permits the re-
ceiver to refuse to honor preexisting leases, mortgages and contracts
that were executed with owners, operators or other controlling persons,
or whose rental, price or interest rate "substantially" exceeds a reason-
188. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144A.15(I) (West Cum. Supp. 1978); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 50.05(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
189. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-621a through -621i (West Cum. Supp. 1979);
KAN. STAT. §§ 39-954 through -963 (Cum. Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-38, -39 (West
Cum. Supp. 1977).
190. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-36, -38 (West Cum. Supp. 1977). In Kansas, the state may seek
receivership whenever conditions exist that threaten resident health or safety. KAN. STAT. §§ 39-
954 through -963 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
191. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-621b, -621c (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
192. Id. § 19-621d.
193. Id. § 19-621e; KAN. STAT. § 39-959 (Cum. Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144A.15(3)
(West Cum. Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-42(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1977); N.Y. Pun.
HEALTH LAW § 2810(2)(c) (McKinney 1977) (expressly prohibiting receiver from making "major
alterations of the physical structure of the facility"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 50.05(7) (West Cum.
Supp. 1978).
194. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144A.15(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1978); N.Y. Pun. HEALTH
LAW § 28 I0(2)(c) (McKinney 1977).
195. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-621f (West Cum. Supp. 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 50.05(7)(e) (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
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able rate. 96 In Connecticut and Wisconsin receivers have special
fiduciary duties to residents during transfer. They must aid in location
or alternative placement, allowing the resident and guardian to partici-
pate in placement selection; assist in discharge planning; and provide
orientation to minimize transfer trauma and transport the resident, his
records and belongings to the new location.197
Receiverships terminate when the state issues a new license, the
residents are moved, the facility is sold,198 or the circumstances that
occasioned appointment of the receiver are corrected.' 99 Notwith-
standing these conditions, four states establish limits upon the duration
of receivership: ninety days in Wisconsin,200 eighteen months in New
York2° ' and Minnesota,20 2 and twenty-four months in Kansas.20 3
While the existence of time limits may assuage due process concerns,
they may arbitrarily limit the ability of a receiver to correct problems
and to find suitable owners or managers to assume control of the
facility.
Recognizing that a major impediment to correcting physical plant
or resident care deficiencies may be inadequate financial management,
reimbursement or reserves, two statutes authorize state funds for which
the receiver may apply.2°4 Without these appropriations it may be dif-
ficult to attract qualified receivers and to permit them adequately to
manage facilities, even for a limited time. Arguably, provisions of state
laws or constitutions requiring states to provide for the indigent sick20 5
or the general welfare20 6 obligate states to fund the additional costs that
a receiver legitimately must spend to discharge his duties.
Although owners have frequently alleged that receivership violates
due process of law, apparently no one has directly challenged the con-
stitutionality of the nursing home receivership statutes or the exercise
of judicial receivership authority to order a receiver for a nursing home
196. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-621e (West Cum. Supp. 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 50.05(9)
(West Cum. Supp. 1978).
197. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-621e (West Cum. Supp. 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 50.05(7)(i) (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
198. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. § 39-963 (Cum. Supp. 1978); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2810(2)(e)
(McKinney 1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 50.05(14) (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
199. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-45 (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
200. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 50.05(4) (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
201. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2810(2)(e)(i)(a) (McKinney 1977).
202. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144A.15(5) (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
203. KAN. STAT. § 39-960 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
204. Id.; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 50.05(10) (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
205. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1750 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
206. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. 7, § 8; art. 17, § 1.
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that has violated health and safety standards. Even if challenged, the
exercise of this remedy would seem to fall within the police powers of
the state if used to protect the general health, safety and welfare of its
citizens. Receiverships have been upheld as a proper exercise of state
police power in cases under the New York housing law providing for
appointment of receivers to manage housing complexes that endanger
health and safety,2 "7 and nursing home receiverships could be constitu-
tionally justified on similar grounds-demonstrably poor conditions
that actually threaten resident health, safety or well-being. They may
also be upheld as a legitimate condition of licensure that states may
impose for violations of the terms of the license. Like license revoca-
tion, however, receivership is permissible only if the procedural due
process requirements of timely notice and hearing have been met.
All the statutes discussed above provide generally for a court hear-
ing before appointment of the receiver, which clearly satisfies the due
process test. The Wisconsin and Connecticut statutes permitting ex
parte appointments in emergencies involve circumstances in which the
state interest in the health and welfare of the nursing home residents is
elevated over the interest of the facility owner in maintaining full man-
agement and control of the institution,0 ' and therefore should survive
constitutional scrutiny. The receiverships that are time-limited are
merely temporary deprivations of property that arguably require less
extensive due process protections.
b. Civil Fines and Citations
Receivership may be an appropriate remedy for serious violations
that jeopardize the health and safety of all facility residents and that
can best be corrected by new management; less severe penalties than
either license revocation or receivership, however, can be administra-
tively simpler and can often force facilities to correct violations that are
not necessarily life threatening, such as those of individual care and
certain sanitation standards. Several states have developed systems of
"citations," whereby facilities are cited for violations that are classified
according to severity. The notices of citations typically are publicly
displayed and may be accompanied by fines for continued violation.
The number of citations issued to each facility can be the basis for re-
imbursement, for ranking facilities according to the quality of care they
207. See, e.g., InreDep'toffBldgs., 16 N.Y.2d 915, 212 N.E.2d 154, 264 N.Y.S.2d 701 (1965);
In re Dep't of Bldgs., 14 N.Y.2d 291, 200 N.E.2d 432, 251 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1964).
208. See, e.g., North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
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provide, and for refusal to admit new residents. California adopted the
first citation system in 1973209 and several other states have patterned
legislation after it.2 '
Under the California citation system, the state licensing agency is
obligated to classify all nursing home licensing standards according to
their seriousness and relationship to resident health and safety.211
Class A violations are those posing an imminent danger to residents or
a substantial probability that serious harm or death will result. 2  Class
B violations are those directly related to health, safety or security.
213
State surveyors inspecting facilities must classify each violation they
find as either Class A or B and issue a citation within three working
days.214 Class A violations must be remedied immediately;21 Class B
violations must be remedied within the time set forth on the citation.
216
Final citations (after appeals) must be prominently posted in pub-
lic view until the deficiencies are corrected.217 Financial penalties may
be imposed for the two types of citations: $1000-$5000 for Class A vio-
lations and $50-$250 for Class B violations.21 8 For every day that a
Class A or B violation goes unabated beyond the time allowed for its
correction, facilities are subject to penalties of $50.219 The state may
collect treble damages against facilities penalized for repeating a viola-
tion within twelve months; 220 however, since penalties for Class B vio-
lations are only assessed if the violations remain uncorrected after the
allotted time, the treble damages sanction is rarely used with respect to
those violations.
221
209. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1417-1439 (West Supp. 1979).
210. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-607 to -613 (West Cum. Supp. 1979); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 135C.36-135C.48 (West Cum. Supp. 1978). See also KAN. STAT. § 39-923(2)
(Cum. Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144A.10 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:11-4(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1977); N.Y. Pus. HEALTH LAW § 2803(3), (6) (McKinney 1977);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.17(E) (Page Cum. Supp. 1978). Wisconsin has for many years had
a citation system accompanied by monetary "forfeitures." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 50.04 (West Cum.
Supp. 1978).
211. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1426 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
212. Id. § 1424(a).
213. Id. § 1424(b).
214. Id. § 1423.
215. Id. § 1424(a).
216. Id. § 1424(b).
217. Id. § 1429.
218. Id. § 1424.
219. Id. § 1425.
220. Id. § 1428(e).
221. JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COMMITTEE, supra note 6, at 14. The Wisconsin law avoids
this problem by permitting treble damages to be collected if notice of repeat violations has been
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In the three years of experience with the California citation sys-
tem, numerous problems have arisen with its structure and implemen-
tation. A Legislative Audit Committee identified some of these issues:
state agency delays in filing complaints to enforce citations and penal-
ties, ineffective use of the treble damages provision, and lack of en-
forcement of Class B violations.222 The last problem is particularly
troubling, as it indicates the means by which facilities can, at least par-
tially, avoid the law. Because facilities do not want Class B citations
that have been corrected within the time limits on the citations to ap-
pear in public records, they will contest the citations through adminis-
trative review. The attorney general's office will typically not prosecute
the citations because to do so would waste time and resources since the
violation has been corrected. The citations are dismissed, even though
they were legitimately issued, and are erased from public record, so
that even if the violations are repeated they cannot form the basis for
treble damages because no previous penalty has been assessed. 223
Another difficulty inherent in the citation-penalty system concerns
the role of surveyors-are they consultants or police? Surveyors who
have difficulty citing facilities for licensing violations are even less com-
fortable knowing that a citation is likely to lead to a financial penalty.
Furthermore, surveyors require careful training in the proper methods
of documenting violations in order to support citations through the ap-
peal process. Still another problem is the emphasis of the California
law on violations of licensing standards that may not directly relate to
resident health and safety. While the California licensing standards are
extremely detailed and comprehensive,224 they maintain the structural
orientation and medical model typical of state licensing and federal
certification regulations, which generally miss the mark of examining
care actually needed by and delivered to nursing home residents.
Litigation on the constitutionality of a penalty system has thus far
only occurred in California. In one of the early state prosecutions of a
citation and penalty assessment, Lackner v. Perkins,225 a state superior
court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the statute deprived
the facility of due process. The court reasoned that because a facility
given rather than only when a penalty has been assessed. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 50.04(5)(a)(5) (West
Cum. Supp. 1978).
222. JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COMMITTEE, s pra note 6, at 14-25.
223. Id.
224. 22 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 72301-72395 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
225. No. 386673 (Sup. Ct. of San Diego Cty. Oct. 27, 1977), rev'd, 91 Cal. App. 3d 433, 154
Cal. Rptr. 138 (1979).
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can either pay the minimum amount set forth in the statute or contest
the citation,226 the law improperly penalizes the exercise of the statu-
tory right to contest citations through the appeal process. Seizing that
decision, the state association of proprietary nursing homes challenged
the constitutionality of the entire citation system on several due process
grounds in Caliornia Association of Health Facilities v. Director, De-
partment of Health.227 In addition to relying on the Perkins holding,
plaintiffs asserted that the statute was unconstitutionally vague in its
definitions of Class A and B violations because it did not provide stan-
dards by which licensees could know what conduct was prohibited.
Further, they contested the statute's delegation to licensing agencies of
the authority to adopt licensing regulations, classify violations, and fix
and assess penalties because it was made without specific legislative
standards and because it created a conflict of agency functions.228 Fi-
nally, plaintiffs asserted that the informal conference procedure did not
satisfy due process.
229
Because other states have adopted penalty systems that may face
similar challenges, it is instructive to examine the issues raised by Per-
kins and Health Facilities. Whether the California statute's definition
of citations is sufficiently precise is debatable.23° Arguably, even with-
out adequate standards in a statute, a court will not invalidate it if the
law establishes appeal procedures adequate to safeguard the rights of
persons subject to administrative action.23t The question of adminis-
trative rulemaking authority, however, and the conflict between legisla-
226. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1428(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). The Iowa law does
not provide this choice; it permits the cited licensee either to contest the citation or pay the entire
fine. IOWA CODE ANN. § 135C.41 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
227. No. 73J-028 (Sup. Ct. of San Francisco City, filed Nov. 25, 1977) (preliminary injunction
denied March 24, 1978), No. 442-43 (1st Dist. June 1, 1978) (writ of prohibition denied).
228. The Department of Health had used the same person to write citations and conduct the
informal conferences, but changed this practice before the case was filed. Conversation with Bill
Smith, Chief of Health Services Section, Licensing and Certification Division, California Dep't of
Health (Dec. 23, 1977). The Iowa statute specifically forbids the person writing the citation from
officiating at the informal conference. IOWA CODE ANN. § 135C.42 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
229. Contrary to the nursing home association's contention that the informal hearing violates
due process of law, it would appear that it meets the rudiments of due process as stated in such
recent cases as Case v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1975), and Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S.
749 (1975). Furthermore, since an entire trial de novo is available in the state court to a licensee
dissatisfied with the hearing officer's decision, that subsequent full trial satisfies the concerns of
due process. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.10 (1958).
230. Compare People v. Barksdale, 8 Cal. 3d 320, 503 P.2d 257, 105 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972) and
McMurty v. Board of Medical Examiners, 180 Cal. App. 2d 760, 4 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1960) with
People v. Hellner, 43 Cal. 2d 715, 227 P.2d 393 (1954) and People v. Fowler, 178 Cal. 657, 174 P.
892 (1918).
231. See K. DAVIS, supra note 229, at § 7.10.
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tive and enforcement functions seems to be well settled.232 All
licensing agencies establish standards for their licensees and then en-
force compliance with those standards through administrative proceed-
ings. It is the violation of a licensing standard that subjects a facility to
a citation and penalty. Clearly the agency has the power to revoke a
facility's license for violation of its standards, and the state agency is
acting no differently when it invokes the more lenient remedy of a pen-
alty short of license revocation. As in the case of the receivership
power, the agency seems to be acting under a delegation of the state's
police powers, but employing less severe remedies, and a court should
uphold the constitutionality of the system.
Perhaps the most serious challenge to the citation-penalty system
was that accepted by the court in Lackner v. Perkins-that the statute
coerced facilities into paying a minimum penalty and forfeiting their
appeal rights, a Hobson's choice that the court felt rose to unconstitu-
tional status.233 Because a facility always retains the right to appeal a
particular penalty, the logic of this decision is curious. Rather than
being comparable to the constitutional waiver of a right to jury trial as
a quid pro quo for the guarantee that a prosecutor would not seek capi-
tal punishment,234 the citation law seems more analogous to a common
penalty system for traffic violations, under which the cited driver may
pay a minimal fine rather than contest the citation in court, where he
might obtain dismissal of the penalty but could also be subject to a
more severe fine.235 Since the legislature adopted the provision to per-
mit a facility to pay a minimum fine, and thereby avoid the imposition
of a possibly stiffer fine on appeal, in order to save the facility and the
state the time and expense of the appeal process, it is ironic that the
choice formed the basis for the Perkins court's invalidation of the statu-
tory scheme; Without that option,236 apparently the court would not
have invalidated the law. Although the Perkins decision was recently
reversed on appeal,237 because the nursing home association's general
challenge to the statute in Health Facilities has not been finally decided
232. See, e.g., People v. Adams, 43 Cal. App. 3d 697, 117 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1974); Nardoni v.
McConnell, 48 Cal. 2d 500, 310 P.2d 644 (1957).
233. No. 386673 (Sup. Ct. of San Diego Cty., Oct. 27, 1977).
234. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
235. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 40512, 42004 (West 1971). See also Note, Cal/ornia Traffic
Law4dministration, 12 STAN. L. REv. 387, 400-401 (1960).
236. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 135C.41 (1)(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1978), which does not
provide such a choice.
237. 91 Cal. App. 3d 433, 154 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1979).
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by the superior court pending that appeal, legislative authority to adopt
a citation-penalty system of this scope remains unclear.
Despite questions about the constitutionality of the citation-
penalty approach, an examination of its effectiveness over the course of
its three-year history remains warranted. California state officials, who
believe that the system is working effectively to improve patient care in
nursing homes, cite the decrease in the number of citations from the
first to the second year of operation, the decrease in the average
number of facility deficiencies during that time, and expedited facility
correction of violations . 38  Few citations have been challenged, and
most of those have been sustained. 239 Administration of the system has
been expensive, costing over $150,000 in legal fees for the state agency
in 1976,240 and about two hours per citation of surveyor and clerical
time2 4' to process the 2500 Class A and B citations.242 Of approxi-
mately $1,180,000 in penalties assessed against facilities from October
1975 through March 1977, the state collected $46,000.243 Costs of col-
lection to the state, therefore, substantially exceed actual returns to the
treasury, but may be offset by the intangible benefit of improved health
and well-being of nursing home residents.
A general problem with any system of penalties is that a monetary
forfeiture will probably come directly out of patient care funds, since it
is unlikely that the facility administrator or owner would pay the pen-
alty out of profits. Thus, the statutes should prohibit payment of the
penalties from direct care funds and should prohibit them as reimburs-
able costs under Medicaid. While such prohibitions might be difficult
238. Interview with Bill Smith, Chief of Health Services Section, Licensing and Certification
Division, California Dep't of Health (Dec. 23, 1977). See also DIVISION OF LICENSING AND CER-
TIFICATION, STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, REPORT TO THE STATE LEGISLATURE ON THE LONG-TERM
CARE, HEALTH, SAFETY AND SECURITY ACT of 1973, at 1, 16 (Feb. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
HEALTH DEP'T REP.].
239. In 1976, 23% of the 3250 citations issued by the Health Department were contested.
HEALTH DEP'T REP., supra note 238, at 17 & Appendix I. Of the 90 Class A citations contested,
60% were sustained, 20% were dismissed entirely, and 20% were either reduced in penalty amount
or reclassified as a Class B violation. Id. at 17 & Appendix J. Of the 650 Class B citations con-
tested, 60% were sustained, 17% were dismissed, and 23% were reduced in penalty amount. Id. at
17 & Appendix K. During that year, 36 cases were appealed to court; two were decided in favor of
the state and one, Perkins, was decided against the state. Id. at 17.
240. JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COMMiTrEE, supra note 6, at 34-35. Facility owners, on the
other hand, have estimated the costs of contesting a citation to be between $900 and $1300. See
Letter from Western Medical Enterprises, Inc., to Joint Legislative Audit Committee (Aug. 30,
1977), in JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COMMITTEE, supra note 6, at 42-43.
241. Interview with Bill Smith, Chief of Health Services Section, Licensing and Certification
Division, California Dep't of Health (Dec. 23, 1977).
242. See HEALTH DEP'T REP., supra note 238, at 15.
243. See JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COMMITTEE, supra note 6, at 48 (Table 3).
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to enforce because they require a careful financial audit to trace the
accounting for penalties, failure to resolve this problem will accrue to
the detriment of the nursing home residents, whose interests the penalty
system was designed to protect.
Since most of the penalty systems were recently enacted,244 other
states have had little experience with them. State agencies, however,
report success in their application to the problem of improving nursing
home care,2 45 and, in combination with other remedies, a system of
civil fines seems to be a useful approach to quality enforcement.
c. Other State Licensing Remedies
As an adjunct to licensing authority, several other remedies are
available to state licensing agencies, including injunctive relief, suspen-
sion of public referrals and admissions, consideration of past perform-
ance in license renewals and reduction of bed quotas.
(i) Injunctions
State agencies or attorneys general acting on their behalf are typi-
cally empowered by statute to seek compliance with the laws they ad-
minister through injunctive relief.2 46 In addition to this general
statutory authorization, several states have enacted broad consumer
protection laws that prohibit deceptive practices and unconscionable
conduct and permit state attorneys general to enforce them through
suits for damages and injunctions.2 47 These laws have been liberally
interpreted in cases involving nursing homes to prohibit patient ne-
glect, infringement of patients' rights, and failure to notify attending
physicians of changes in patient status, to maintain sanitary conditions,
to provide adequate nursing care and to maintain sufficient staff.
248
Other states have enacted specific legislation authorizing state agencies
to enforce nursing home licensing laws and regulations through
injunctions.249
244. See note 210 supra.
245. See, e.g., Letter from Dana L. Petrowsky, Director, Health Facilities Licensure Program,
Iowa State Dep't of Health, to Author (Aug. 31, 1978) (copy on file in the office of the North
Carolina Law Review).
246. See, eag., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3369 (West 1970).
247. See, e.g., TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978).
248. See, eg., id, enforced against a nursing home in State v. Southwest Mediplex, No. 77-
1587 (Dist. Ct., Travis County) (rRO issued Feb. 23, 1978).
249. See, eg., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1430 (West Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 144a.12 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 30:11-4(a) (west Cum. Supp. 1978); N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2801-C (McKinney 1977).
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Injunctive relief is in theory particularly appropriate to remedy vi-
olations of licensing standards: courts of equity are familiar and com-
fortable with issuing injunctive orders; hearings and relief can be
obtained expeditiously in urgent cases; and unlike financial penalties,
which do not directly assure correction of the licensing violations and
which may actually impair provision of resident care services, injunc-
tions can directly mandate correction of violations. On the other hand,
although injunctive relief is couched in prohibitory language, it most
frequently requires affirmative action on the part of the facility. For
example, an order to "refrain from failing to provide adequate nursing
care" really mandates that the facility provide sufficient personnel,
services and supplies to meet resident needs. Some courts, therefore,
hesitate to issue injunctions, especially when they will require oversight
and active judicial involvement in nursing home administration and
management. Furthermore, obtaining an order does not guarantee
compliance. The penalty for contempt is usually a fine or jail sentence,
but courts may be reluctant to hold nursing home owners or operators
in contempt if they are making any apparent attempt to correct the
deficiencies at issue. The effectiveness of the injunctive remedy, there-
fore, depends upon the willingness of the facility management to com-
ply and its perception of the consequences of refusing to do so, that is,
the likelihood of the court taking aggressive steps to enforce its order.
(ii) Suspension of Referrals
Because nursing homes rely heavily upon public financing under
Medicaid,25° a potentially powerful agency remedy for violations of li-
censing standards is suspension of resident referrals by public agencies
while violations remain uncorrected. This remedy is justified both to
prompt compliance with standards and to protect potential residents
from entering facilities with deficiencies, although the latter ground
suggests that the state ought to remove or otherwise protect the existing
residents of the facility as well. The California citation law prohibits
public agencies from referring residents to facilities with any uncor-
rected Class A violations or five or more Class B violations, making an
important exception for facilities in areas of shortage. 25' A noteworthy
quid pro quo for this limitation on public referral to deficient facilities
is the state licensing agency's obligation annually to notify public agen-
cies of facilities without any A or B violations and the obligation im-
250. See note 12 supra.
251. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1434 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
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posed upon those agencies to give such facilities priority in referring
public patients."' 2 Wisconsin law goes further, requiring the state to
prepare a monthly list of facilities with Class A violations or five or
more of any violations for which a plan of correction has not been filed,
implemented or accepted. 53 Facilities on that list may not accept pub-
lic patients, 25 4 as under California law, nor may they admit any new
patients-public or private-while a Class A or five or more Class B
citations remain uncorrected. 255  Referral suspension, however, has
only been imposed sporadically; officials of the California licensing
agency, for example, indicate that while the referral system is function-
ing effectively in Los Angeles County, it is not used in other parts of the
state.256
Regardless of the effectiveness of referral suspensions, their impo-
sition, at least under the California citation statute, is constitutionally
suspect. Because a suspension seems to constitute as much of a depri-
vation of property as a revocation of a facility's license or Medicaid
certification, its imposition arguably requires a prior hearing in order to
comport with due process of law, unless the suspension can be justified
on the basis of an emergency.257 The Wisconsin law expressly permits
facilities to seek a hearing to contest the state's determination to sus-
pend referrals or admissions.2 58 It is not clear, however, whether a sim-
ilar hearing is required under the California law. While other sections
of the citation statute refer to "final" citations, occurring after opportu-
nity for appeal,259 the referral section prohibits referrals when there are
"uncorrected violations. 2 6 0 Because a violation can remain uncor-
rected while a citation is being contested, it may be argued that the
legislature did not intend to permit hearings before the suspension of
referrals. Although this issue has apparently not been raised, were the
California statute so construed, it might be found constitutionally
deficient.
252. Id.
253. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 50.04(4)(d) (Vest Cum. Supp. 1978).
254. Id. § 50.04(4)(d)(2).
255. Id. § 50.04(4)(d)(3).
256. JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COMMITTEE, supra note 6, at 33-34; interview with Aileen
Adams, formerly with Los Angeles City Attorney's Office (Nov. 25, 1977).
257. For situations in which a particular facility might not be seriously harmed, a subsequent
hearing might suffice. In any case, an expeditious and informal hearing would seem to satisfy due
process. See notes 150-51 and accompanying text upra.
258. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 50.04(4)(e) (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
259. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1428(a), 1429(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
260. Id. § 1434.
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States without specific legislation authorizing suspension of refer-
rals can accomplish similar ends through publicizing the results of in-
spections and/or ranking facilities according to the number and
severity of deficiencies.261 Informed public agencies and prospective
nursing home residents and their relatives can then make decisions
about nursing home placement according to the relative quality of the
facilities indicated by this rating.
(iii) Reducing Bed Quotas
Another creative enforcement mechanism that can be employed
by state licensing agencies is to reclassify a facility not providing a
given level of care to the level of care it can in fact provide, or to reduce
the bed quota of a facility commensurate with the type, quality and
quantity of care it can provide. West Virginia has adopted such legisla-
tion,262 permitting the state agency to reclassify or reduce bed quotas
upon a finding "that the licensee is not providing adequate care under
the facility's existing classification or quota, and that reclassification,
reduction in quota or both would place the licensee in a position to
render adequate care. '  Since this provision was only recently en-
acted, there has been no experience with its implementation. Obvi-
ously, however, reclassification raises the procedural due process
problems discussed earlier. In addition, the usefulness of this approach
is limited to situations in which a reduction in bed capacity or classifi-
cation, for example, from SNF to ICF, would remedy a violation of a
licensing standard, such as an insufficient number of registered nurses.
Within these constraints, however, it provides the potential for state
agencies to tailor enforcement mechanisms to precise license violations.
(iv) Consideration of Past Performance
A final license remedy that states are adopting is consideration of
the past performance of a facility in determining whether to renew an
annual license for that facility or others involving the same owners and
managers. The West Virginia licensing statute directs the state agency
to issue a license to a facility whose principals and controlling persons
have not had licenses revoked during the previous five years.2 4 Kan-
sas law permits the state to deny a nursing home license to any person
261. See, e.g., N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2803(c) (McKinney 1977).
262. See W. VA. CODE § 16-5C-1 1(a) (Supp. 1978).
263. Id. § 16-5C-1 1(c).
264. Id. § 16-5C-6(b)(1).
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who has wilfully or repeatedly violated the state licensing standards,
has failed to "assure that nutrition, medication and treatment of resi-
dents" accord with acceptable medical practice, or has assisted in any
violation of the licensing standards.265 Similarly, Colorado regulations
permit the state agency to consider a licensee's compliance with state
licensing and Medicaid-Medicare certification standards in determin-
ing whether the licensee is "fit" to hold a license.266 New Jersey law
forbids the state agency from issuing a license to a person "who has
been twice found guilty of violating" the state licensing standards by a
court or who has admitted guilt.2 67 Minnesota law forbids issuing a
license to a facility if its controlling persons operated another nursing
home during the previous two years with uncorrected violations for
which a fine was assessed and collected, if there were two or more vio-
lations creating an imminent risk of harm to a resident, or if there were
ten or more violations of any type.268 These statutes vary in the weight
that a state agency must accord past licensing violations, and in the
weight given to the nature of past violations. Furthermore, all of them
do not clearly permit licensing agencies to look at the quality of care in
other facilities owned or managed by the licensee.269 To the extent that
the licensing standards do indicate quality of care, this authority to
consider past performance in all facilities where the licensee exercises
management or control is an important tool for licensing agencies to
employ in continuing quality enforcement, especially as nursing homes
are increasingly multiply-owned or operated by chains.
(v) Certificate of Need Authority
Particularly since enactment of the National Health Planning and
Development Act of 1974,270 many states have adopted programs by
which they review the necessity and desirability of capital expansion,
construction, or equipment acquisition by or on behalf of health facili-
ties.271 These "certificate of need" programs prohibit health facilities,
including hospitals and nursing homes, from making certain capital ex-
265. KAN. STAT. § 39-923(9)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
266. Standards for Health Facilities Licensure, ch. 2, § 2.4.1.4.3 (1977). See also WiS. STAT.
ANN. § 50.03(4)(a)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
267. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:11-1 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
268. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144A.04(4) (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
269. Compare the Colorado Regulations, supra note 266, and the Minnesota statute, supra
note 268, with the Kansas, New Jersey and West Virginia statutes, supra notes 265, 267 & 264.
270. National Health Planning and Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat,
2225 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
271. See generally Wing & Craige, this Symposium.
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penditures without the approval of local and state health planning
agencies. 272 It is not made clear in either the federal legislation or in
state certificate of need laws whether quality of care is one of the crite-
ria that can be used to make certificate of need decisions. Local and
state certificate of need agencies should examine the quality of care
prior to approval of requests by nursing homes that want to make fur-
ther capital expenditures. In determining the need for nursing home
beds, states should also discount the availability of poor quality
beds.2 7 3 These approaches may be difficult without explicit state statu-
tory authority, and few states have incorporated such criteria into their
certificate of need programs. The Colorado law, however, expressly re-
quires a certificate for the acquisition of a nursing home by lease or
purchase if the planning agencies determine that a poor quality of care
was provided by the acquiring owner or lessee in other facilities it had
managed or owned. 4 Under this law the planning agencies examine
the record of quality of care of prospective owners and lessees, using
compliance with licensing standards and Medicaid-Medicare certifica-
tion requirements as quality indicators.275 Inquiry into the compliance
with similar standards in other states has resulted in the Colorado state
agency's refusal to issue certificates of need for prospective owners or
lessees to acquire facilities in the state when those persons have had a
record of providing poor quality care in facilities in other states in
which they were principals. 6
Although the state licensing agency may be separate from the
agency performing certificate of need and health planning, the poten-
tial for coordination between these agencies, using planning and certifi-
cate of need power to assist in enforcement of quality of care in nursing
homes, should not be overlooked. It is regrettable that licensing-certifi-
cation functions and health planning-certificate of need functions have
rarely been closely coordinated and that the power of each of these
programs has been diluted as a result.277
272. 42 C.F.R. § 123A04 (1977).
273. See OHIO REP., supra note 6, at 10.
274. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-3-506(1)(i) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
275. COLORADO DEP'T OF HEALTH, CERTIFICATE OF NEED PROJECT REVIEW MANUAL
§ I(A)(9)(c) (1979).
276. The Colorado Department of Health refused to issue a certificate of need to the owner of
a Texas nursing home chain to purchase a Colorado nursing home on the ground that the owner
had a poor quality record in its Texas facilities.
277. The Colorado Department of Health was organized with both planning and licensing
under one assistant director. Few other state agenices are thus constituted.
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(vi) Criminal Sanctions
While operating a nursing home without a license is typically de-
fined as a misdemeanor under state law, 78 violations of licensing stan-
dards are not generally defined as criminal.27 9 Under its general
authority to prosecute violations of state law, however, the Los Angeles
City Attorney's Office in 1975 and 1976 undertook a major criminal
investigation and prosecution of nursing home violations of state li-
censing standards, including failure to provide for therapeutic diets,
commingling of resident funds, unsanitary conditions, insufficient staff,
medication charting errors, and failure to provide required resident
care.28 0 Out of fifteen prosecutions initiated in 1975, the office obtained
fourteen convictions, resulting in fines up to $15,000 and/or probation.
Most of the owners convicted of the misdemeanors sold their facili-
ties. 8 ' Officials in the City Attorney's Office felt that using the crimi-
nal process improved quality of care in nursing homes since they did
not receive further complaints about any of the same facilities after the
successful prosecutions. These officials also felt that criminal actions
were more successful than civil ones, because, although harder to
prove, they had a greater deterrent impact and were brought to trial
more quickly than civil actions because of the expedited discovery pro-
ceedings and acceleration of criminal cases in the courts.282 Despite
this apparent success in Los Angeles, the criminal enforcement effort
has not been replicated elsewhere in California.283 Furthermore, while
prosecutors can prove specific acts of patient abuse, it may be difficult
to assign criminal responsibility for patient neglect because of the vari-
ety of persons generally responsible for patient care in nursing
homes.284
278. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 1352C21(l) (West Cum. Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 144A.02(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 50.01(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
279. But see N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 12-b (McKinney 1977), OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3721.99 (Page Cum. Supp. 1978).





284. See NAAG REP., supra note 64, at 52. Another problem with criminal prosecution for
nursing home licensing violations is the allegation that evidence gained through unannounced
inspections is the fruit of an unlawful search and seizure that violates the fourth amendment of the
Constitution. See, e.g., People v. White, 259 Cal. App. 2d 936, 65 Cal. Rptr. 923 (1968); Uzzillia v.
Commissioner, 47 A.D.2d 492, 367 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1975). It has also been argued that to subpoena
records of nursing homes that are sole proprietorships would violate the fifth amendment protec-
tion against self-incrimination. See, e.g., Sigety v. Hynes, 83 Misc. 2d 648, 372 N.Y.S.2d 771,
af'd, 49 A.D.2d 700, 373 N.Y.S.2d 848, rev'd, 38 N.Y.2d 260, 342 N.E.2d 518, 379 N.Y.S.2d 724
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Some states have enacted laws prohibiting fraud or concealment of
facts to obtain Medicaid reimbursement, which includes obtaining
Medicaid payment for services, such as nursing home services, not ac-
tually provided to beneficiaries as needed. 285 The Medicare-Medicaid
Anti-Fraud and Abuse amendments of 1977,286 a recent addition to the
Social Security Act, create federal penalties for making false statements
in applications for Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement. The
amendments also increase the rate of federal funding to ninety percent
for states that establish Medicaid Fraud Control Units and coordinate
them with the state Medicaid agency, attorney general's office and dis-
trict attorneys.287 The units are specifically responsible for receiving
complaints about abuse and neglect of patients in Medicaid health fa-
cilities and prosecuting violations under criminal law or referring them
to other state agencies for appropriate actions.288 Despite the generous
federal financing of these units and their potential for prosecuting seri-
ous cases of resident abuse and neglect, few states have established
them.289
3. Enforcement Actions by Private Parties
Traditionally, private parties injured by the failure of health insti-
tutions to meet standards of care will assert their right to collect dam-
ages through civil actions for negligence, assault or battery. A
prerequisite for recovery in these tort cases, however, is that the plain-
tiff's injury be measurable in monetary damages, calculated according
to life expectancy and earning potential.29° While clear standards have
been developed to evaluate the loss of life or limb for persons of young
age or wage-earning capacity, it has been assumed that the life or
(1975); Lewis v. Hynes, 82 Misc. 2d 256, 368 N.Y.S.2d 738 (1975). In New York, where both these
contentions have been extensively litigated, courts have rejected them. See Uzzillia v. Commis-
sioner, 47 A.D.2d 492, 367 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1975); Sigety v. Hynes, 83 Misc. 2d 648, 372 N.Y.S.2d
771 (1975). The New York Special Prosecutor's Office has obtained numerous criminal convic-
tions for nursing home fraud and abuse. NEw YORK SPECIAL PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, SECOND
ANNUAL REPORT TO GOVERNOR CAREY 12 (1977).
285. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 400.601 (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 16.6141(3)) (Cum. Supp.
1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:40-17 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
286. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn, 1396h (1976).
287. Id. § 1396(q).
288. Id. § 1396(q)(4); 43 C.F.R. § 455.300(0 (1977).
289. As of December 20, 1978, only 22 states had requested HEW certification for their Medi-
caid Fraud Control Units and only 19 had received certification. [1979] MEDICARE & MEDICAID
GUIDE (CCH) 252. Units in Colorado, California and Louisiana have been undermined by
personal and political difficulties and scandals.
290. Damages for personal injury are usually based in part on actuarial life expectancy. See
D. DoBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 549 (4th ed. 1975).
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health of an elderly person in a nursing home is incapable of financial
evaluation and therefore cannot be compensated in a suit for damages.
Despite this widespread view, some residents have recovered substan-
tial awards for violations of state licensing and Medicaid certification
standards,29' and private litigation on behalf of nursing home residents
is increasing.292
Private litigation is made even more difficult to pursue, however, if
the plaintiff must remain in the institution, where he legitimately fears
direct or indirect retaliation. For this reason, many dissatisfied and/or
abused residents of nursing homes do not even complain about mis-
treatment, much less pursue legal remedies for it. At least one court,
however, has permitted the use of pseudonyms for plaintiffs in such
cases to preserve their anonymity and protect them from retaliatory
treatment.293 Additional protection is available through state statutes
that expressly prohibit facilities from retaliating against persons filing
complaints with state agencies or proceeding against the facilities di-
rectly.294 These statutes create a rebuttable presumption that any dis-
criminatory treatment within a given time of the resident's action was
done in retaliation for the action.
Having overcome the reluctance of courts, private attorneys and
residents to pursue private civil litigation for patient abuse or neglect,
the question becomes what causes of action can an aggrieved plaintiff
assert. The most traditional cause of action is one for injury resulting
from the negligence of facility staff-either physical abuse, such as the
improper use of restraints or medication, lack of protection from other
patients, 295 or neglect, such as the failure to provide care resulting in
decubitus ulcers or failure to observe a medically prescribed diet.296
Employees directly responsible for such acts can be held accountable
for them, and employers can be subjected to liability for employee mis-
conduct under the doctrine of respondeat superior.291 The extent to
291. In one case, plaintiff class of nursing home residents obtained $16,000 in compensatory
damages and $500,000 in punitive damages in a challenge to a nursing home's conversion of
patient care funds. Brandenburg v. Charapata, No. 422-112 (Multnomah City, Or. Cir. Ct., 1978).
292. See, e.g., Smith v. O'Halloran, No. 75-M-539 (D. Colo., June 5, 1975).
293. Resident v. Emmanual Family Training Center, Inc., No. C78-477 (D. Ohio, 1978). The
court applied the test of anonymity from Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124 (1973), whether "disclo-
sure of a litigant's name would subject the litigant to undue and unnecessary injury."
294. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1432(a), (b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 135C.46 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.17(G) (Page Cum.
Supp. 1978).
295. See, e.g., Bezark v. Kostner Manor, Inc., 29 Ill. App. 2d 106, 172 N.E.2d 424 (1961).
296. See, e.g., Hendricks v. Sanford, 216 Or. 149, 337 P.2d 974 (1959).
297. See, e.g., Jefferson Hosp., Inc. v. Van Lear, 186 Va. 74, 41 S.E.2d 441 (1947).
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which a facility is responsible for the conduct of individuals it does not
employ is unclear. Under the doctrine espoused in Darling v. Charles-
ton Community Memorial Hospital,29 health facilities are responsible
for the negligent acts of not only their employees, but also those per-
sons practicing independently within the institution, as long as the fa-
cility had reason to believe the person might be seriously negligent and
the facility had the opportunity to protect the patient against the harm.
Thus, it would appear that facilities have a responsibility for protecting
residents against the gross negligence of outside consultants and attend-
ing physicians and that this doctrine may be applied in some circum-
stances to simply negligent treatment.299
In determining the standard of care to be applied in a case of nurs-
ing home negligence, it may be possible to assert that the federal Medi-
caid Conditions of Participation and state licensing standards establish
the underlying duty.3" Furthermore, although the standard of care re-
mains that of the reasonable man, the frailty of nursing home residents
may require the facility to exercise the greater care commensurate with
the physical condition of its residents.3"'
A breach of the facility's contract with the resident can also form
the basis of a claim for relief for the facility's failure to provide ade-
quate quality of care. Admission agreements rarely include express
terms requiring facilities to provide high quality care, but arguably can
be held to incorporate implicitly the requirements of state licensing
standards, Medicaid standards (for Medicaid beneficiaries), and war-
ranties of habitability provided in state housing laws.3 2 Many admis-
sion contracts disclaim liability for resident safety or the acts of
employees following physician orders. These provisions, however,
would appear to be unconscionable and contrary to public policy, and
the Federal Trade Commission is considering adopting a rule prohibit-
ing such disclaimers." 3
298. 33 Il. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
299. See Hackler, Expansion of Health Care Providers' Liabilit. An Application of Darling to
Long-Term Health Care Facilities, 9 CONN. L. REv. 462 (1977).
300. But see Stogsdill v. Manor Convalescent Home, Inc., 35 IlL. App. 3d 634, 664, 343 N.E.2d
589,611 (1976); Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 3d 326,211 N.E.2d 253
(1965). See also Hackler, supra note 299, at 470-71.
301. See Dunahoo v. Brooks, 272 Ala. 87, 128 S.E.2d 485 (1961).
302. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Steele v. Latimer,
214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 112 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
Implied warranties of fitness and merchantibility apply to goods, not services. Regan, When Nurs-
ing Home Patients Complain The Ombudsman or the Patient Advocate, 65 GEo. L.J. 691, 714
(1971).
303. The Federal Trade Commission is investigating deceptive and misleading advertising
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In addition to asserting breaches of contracts with residents, nurs-
ing home patients have been permitted to assert the rights of third party
beneficiaries to any contract between the facility and the state,304 such
as the Medicaid Provider Agreement, °5 which includes all the Medi-
caid-Medicare Conditions of Participation, including the patients'
rights standards.
Beyond contract claims, it is also possible in some states to derive a
cause of action directly from state or federal nursing home standards.
Some state statutes, such as California's, expressly provide such a pri-
vate right of action, permitting any person acting for himself or the
general public to seek injunctive relief or damages for a facility's con-
tinuing violation after a citation has been issued.316 Other statutes pro-
vide a much broader private remedy. The New York and West
Virginia laws authorize a private right of action for injuries to the
rights of any nursing home resident created by a contract or by any
state or federal law or regulation. 30 7 These laws provide for compensa-
tory and punitive damages and injunctive relief. They permit the de-
fense that the facility exercised all care reasonably necessary to prevent
the injury, but expressly prohibit the defense of exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies. Both statutes also exempt any damage award to
Medicaid recipients from consideration as income or assets in deter-
mining initial or continuing Medicaid eligibility,30 8 which is an impor-
tant consideration in encouraging injured residents to assert their
rights. The laws further nullify any oral or written waiver of the right
to commence legal action.30 9 New York's law also provides for attor-
neys' fees310 and prohibits premiums for liability insurance to cover
and business practices by nursing homes, including contractual disclaimers, extra charges for ap-
parently routine items, lack of free choice in obtaining drugs and personal supplies, theft of resi-
dents' funds and belongings, and improper accounting for bills. Since the FTC's jurisdiction
extends only to commercial aspects of the industry, it is considering issuing a Trade Regulation
Rule prohibiting unconscionable contract disclaimers, mandating freedom of choice of suppliers,
and requiring disclosure of services for which extra charges will be made, termination policies,
and refund practices. Dole, supra note 96, at 2.
304. See Fuzie v. Manor Care, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 689 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
305. See Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1972).
306. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1430 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
307. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2801-d (McKinney 1977); W. VA. CODE § 16-5C-15(c) (Supp.
1978). The New York law sets a minimum level of damages recoverable in such an action at 25%
of the daily Medicaid patient rate.
308. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2801-d(5) (McKinney 1977); W. VA. CODE § 16-5C-15(c)
(Supp. 1978).
309. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2801-d(7) (McKinney 1977); W. VA. CODE § 16-5C-15(c)
(Supp. 1978).
310. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2801-d(6) (McKinney 1977). Seealso OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3721.17(I) (Page Cum. Supp. 1978).
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private action awards from being allowable costs reimbursable to the
nursing home under Medicaid. 1'
The existence of these statutes creating private rights of action is
particularly important in view of conflicting judicial interpretations of
whether aggrieved nursing home residents have implied rights of action
under the federal Medicaid-Medicare Conditions of Participation or
state licensing standards. The Medicaid statute, which generally directs
state Medicaid agencies to design their programs to conform to broadly
outlined federal policies, has been enforced by beneficiaries of the pro-
gram without first seeking relief from HEW, the federal agency
charged with its general enforcement.312 Courts have permitted such
direct actions by beneficiaries since the Supreme Court, in Rosado v.
Wyman,3"3 expressly held that beneficiaries of the Social Security Act
need not seek relief from HEW but can sue offending state agencies
directly. In essence, the Court held that there was a private right of
action for a beneficiary of the Social Security Act against a state for
neglect of its duties under the Act.
Few courts, however, have addressed the question whether there is
also a private right of action under the Social Security Act or its regula-
tions against other entities, such as nursing homes, that have express
duties under the legislation.314 The three reported cases that have thus
far raised the issue have reached inconsistent conclusions. In Berry v.
First Healthcare Corp.,3 ' plaintiffs challenged the nursing home's pol-
icy of transferring persons who became eligible for Medicaid after re-
siding in the facility for less than two years. The Federal District Court
for the District of New Hampshire held that the plaintiff nursing home
residents properly stated a claim under the federal Medicaid regula-
tions regarding a patient's right not to be transferred except under cer-
tain circumstances. 316 The court briefly examined the question whether
the Medicaid statute created a private right of action, noting that Con-
gress had not specifically refused to grant such a right. The court also
found that since there was no HEW provision permitting plaintiffs to
seek administrative review of the nursing home's action, it must permit
311. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2801-d(9) (McKinney 1977).
312. See, e.g., Hayes v. Stanton, 512 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1975); Blue v. Craig, 505 F.2d 830 (4th
Cir. 1974); Schaak v. Schmidt, 344 F. Supp. 99 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Triplett v. Cobb, 331 F. Supp.
652 (D. Miss. 1971); Wilczynski v. Harder, 323 F. Supp. 509 (D. Conn. 1971); Fullington v. Shea,
320 F. Supp. 500 (D. Colo. 1970), af'd 404 U.S. 963 (1971).
313. 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
314. See, e.g., Yanez v. Jones, 361 F. Supp. 701 (N.D. Utah 1973).
315. No. 77-208 (D.N.H., Oct. 26, 1977).
316. Id.; see42 C.F.R. §405.1121(4) (1978).
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judicial review, citing other cases in which private rights of action have
been directly implied from federal statutes and the Constitution.
3t 7
While this analysis might seem simplistic, it is consistent with the treat-
ment of beneficiaries enforcing the Medicaid law against state agencies.
In Roberson v. Wood,31 8 the Federal District Court for the Eastern
District of Illinois found a private right of action in a suit by Medicaid
nursing home residents threatened by transfer. The court followed the
tests for implying such a claim set forth by the Supreme Court in Cori v.
Ash, 3 19 a case in which stockholders unsuccessfully attempted to assert
a private right of action for damages under a federal election law pro-
viding criminal penalties for corporate campaign contributions. The
court found that the Medicaid statute was enacted for the particular
benefit of nursing home resident plaintiffs, that Congress must implic-
itly have intended that they could enforce those rights, that the remedy
of private enforcement was consistent with the underlying purposes of
the Medicaid statute, and that since the program was exclusively fed-
eral the remedy was not one traditionally relegated to state law.320
The Roberson court expressly distinguished Fuzie v. Manor Care,
Inc. ,32 in which the Federal District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio denied a private right of action on facts identical to those in
Berry. After a lengthy discussion of the background and purposes of
the Medicaid program and the involvement of private nursing homes
in the program, the Fuzie court held that because defendant nursing
home was not acting under color of state law, plaintiff could not state a
claim against it under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 or the Constitution,322
317. No. 77-208 (D.N.H., Oct. 26, 1977) (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946)),
318. 464 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Ill. 1979).
319. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
320. 464 F. Supp. at 983.
321. 461 F. Supp. 689 (N.D. Ohio 1977). This decision was important for establishing federal
jursidiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976), and the right of the prevailing party to seek attorney's
fees, see 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). In Buseho v. Northwest Care Centers, Inc., No. A7706.08560 (D.
Or., June 22, 1978), a "transfer case" arising out of patients' rights regulations regarding transfers,
the court denied the nursing home's motion to dismiss, holding that plaintiff did state a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). See also Fried v. Straussman, 82 Misc. 2d 121, 369 N.Y.S.2d 591,
a.ff'dment, 50 A.D.2d 919, 377 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1975), rev'd, 41 N.Y.2d 376, 361 N.E.2d 984, 393
N.Y.S.2d 334 (1977). In Buseho, plaintiff also sued the Medicaid and licensing agencies on the
ground that the state negligently insisted that the facility correct deficiencies or close in five days.
The facility then moved plaintiffs decedent, leading to her death. The court denied the state's
motion to dismiss, which had been based on the contention that the Medicaid plan created no
duty to plaintiffs decedent or that any duty so created was discretionary.
322. No. C77-265 (N.D. Ohio, July 7, 1977), reprinted in [19771 MEDICARE & MEDICAID
GUIDE (CCH) 28,694. Plaintiff in Buscho v. Northwest Care Center, Inc., No. A7706.08560 (D.
Or., June 22, 1978) alleged that the State of Oregon had required that the facility move residents
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that the Social Security Act provided no implied right of action for
enforcement of the federal nursing home standards, and that a private
right of action under the Medicaid nursing home regulations met none
of the tests enunciated in Cort v. Ash for implying a private right of
action.323 The Fuzie court found, however, that plaintiff had stated a
claim for breach of contract because she was a third party beneficiary
of the provider agreement, which incorporated the federal standards,
including the transfer limitations that underlay her claim, between the
state Medicaid agency and the nursing home defendant.3 24 The court
needing a higher level of nursing care, increase staff or close the nursing home. See also Stitt v.
Manor Care, Inc., No. C78-630 (N.D. Ohio, Oct. 24, 1978), reprintedin [19781 MEDICARE & MEDI-
CAID GUIDE (CCH) 1 29,409.
323. The first test in Cort is whether the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit the
statute was enacted. 422 U.S. at 78. The Fuzie court, while conceding that the Medicaid law and
regulations seem to indicate that Medicaid beneficiaries are "among the class of persons for whose
benefit this legislation was enacted and the regulations promulgated," inexplicably concluded that
plaintiffs did not satisfy the test because they did not have an absolute right not to be transferred.
For instance, residents could not prevent transfer if the nursing home's provider agreement was
cancelled by the state. No. C77-265 (N.D. Ohio, July 7, 1977), reprinted in [1977] MEDICARE &
MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) T 28,694. Whether an absolute right exists under the federal law should
make no difference in determining whether the statute creates a private cause of action for its
enforcement. That concern relates only to ultimate remedy.
The second Cort test is whether any legislative pronouncement explicitly or implicitly sug-
gests the intent to create or deny a private cause of action. 422 U.S. at 78. In reaching its conclu-
sion, the Fuzie court pointed to the requirements for judicial review of administrative decisions
under Medicare, 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(c) (1976), and noted the absence of any parallel in the Medi-
caid statute. What the court failed to note is the distinction between Medicare, an exclusively
federal program in which all terms of eligibility, benefits and appeal systems are specifically de-
scribed, and Medicaid, in which states are given discretion to develop programs under federal
guidelines. The failure to spell out judicial review of Medicaid claims for beneficiaries does not,
therefore, prove that there is no private right of action intended under the Medicaid statute. More
than ten years of experience under Medicaid, during which courts have permitted beneficiaries to
sue states for failures to follow federal law, see note 312 supra, and several subsequent amend-
ments to the Medicaid statute, in which Congress has implicitly acquiesced in these judicial deci-
sions, support the better view that there is no legislative intent to deny a private right of action
under the Medicaid statute.
While it is true that states may have the primary enforcement role under Medicaid, their
failure to monitor nursing home compliance, which has been recognized by Congress, S. REP. No.
404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1965), reinforces the need for a right of the beneficiary to pursue the
enforcement, especially when he or she has no right to trigger administrative enforcement at either
the federal or state level. See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970). In Curt v. Ash, the
Supreme Court held that stockholder derivative suits are such cases.
324. While breach of contract claims are certainly an area of state law, it would have been
disingenuous for the court to hold that when the very contract term at issue is one created by
federal law the federal courts should not permit its enforcement in a federal forum. The final twist
to the convoluted logic of this case came, however, when the court determined that plaintiff had
pleaded a contract claim as a third party beneficiary, which was proper under state law, and
permitted plaintiff to remain in federal court by asserting jurisdiction over the pendent state claim
and the pendent party, despite the lack of a federal claim presumably required for pendent juris-
diction. To achieve this objective the court unconvincingly distinguished Aldinger v. Howard, 427
U.S. 1 (1976), in which the Supreme Court had refused to extend pendent party jurisdiction to
parties over whom there was no independent basis for federal jurisdiction.
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then permitted plaintiff to proceed on this contract claim in her federal
action.
The finding of the Fuzie court that defendant nursing home was
not acting under color of state law is understandable in view of recent
Supreme Court decisions requiring a high degree of state involvement
in the actual challenged policy or action for such a finding. 25 Mere
government subsidy and regulation are not enough to turn private ac-
tion into state action, although active participation in challenged con-
duct (such as requiring the transfer contrary to the federal standard)
should constitute sufficient state involvement. The approach of the
Fuzie case, however, would make it impossible for most beneficiaries
deprived of Medicaid statutory rights by providers to enforce them,
since nursing homes are among the few Medicaid providers that exe-
cute annual contracts with state agencies and the vast majority of
health care providers, including hospitals and physicians, do not do
SO.
3 2 6
Even if courts are willing to imply private rights of action, private
enforcement of quality of care in long-term care institutions is no
greater than the underlying quality standards in federal certification
rules or state licensing regulations. Because of the significant weak-
nesses of these standards in assuring quality of care, 7 the right of resi-
dents to protect themselves through such litigation is correspondingly
limited.
E Public Involvement in Nursing Home Quality of Care Enforcement
While state and federal agencies should better perform their re-
sponsibilities to establish and enforce standards to assure quality of
care for nursing home residents, and while private actions may enhance
the right to such care, any regulatory or judicial action is insufficient to
fulfill this task completely. The public should be actively involved in
monitoring the care in nursing homes as well as the functioning of the
enforcement agencies. Because there is no real constituency supporting
325. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 435, 451 (1974).
326. In Yanez v. Jones, 361 F. Supp. 701 (N.D. Utah 1972), plaintiffs challenged private physi-
cians' refusal to follow a Medicaid regulation, 42 C.F.R. § 447.15 (1978), which required them to
accept Medicaid rates as full payment and prohibited them from charging to their Medicaid pa-
tients any additional sums. The court permitted the action to proceed against the state Medicaid
agency, which was required by the regulation to enforce the provision against all providers, but
declined to permit an action directly against the offending physician, despite the apparently con-
trary precedent in the Tenth Circuit of Eureste v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1972).
327. See notes 79-95 and accompanying text supra.
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agency enforcement efforts, licensing agencies are subject to constant
industry pressure without the counterpressure--or reinforcement-
from nursing home reform interests representing the community in
general and residents in particular. The Nursing Home Ombudsmen
funded in each state by the federal Administration on Aging328 are ill-
suited for this task since they are usually state agencies rather than
community groups, which are less subject to industry pressure.32 9
Without a strong, vocal constituency representing nursing home resi-
dents' interests, even the best-intentioned regulators and policymakers
are worn down and enervated by constant industry pressure to weaken
enforcement efforts.
Community interest and concern is perhaps the single most impor-
tant reason that small, rural nursing homes (which may not comply
fully with safety or fire standards) often have the best reputations for
providing a high quality of care and life to residents. When the resi-
dents and their families are neighbors and acquaintances of the nursing
home owners, operators and staff, and when the community actively
supports and encourages the facility in efforts to provide good care,
residents report a high degree of satisfaction with services. As one
commentator has noted:
To make the point that institutions do a better job when outsid-
ers are constantly coming in and out is not to suggest that they main-
tain their standards only for show. Rather, it is to recognize that we
all depend on the interest and appreciation of other people to keep
our morale and the quality of our work high. Dressing for dinner in
the desert is not a standard most of us could keep to. We tidy the
house for the visit of friends because of standards they and we share,
and because we want them to appreciate our house as we do.
330
Community groups supporting nursing home residents have developed
in some parts of the country. Organizations such as Citizens for Better
Care in Detroit, 331 Friends of Nursing Home Patients in Chapel Hill,
328. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3027 (a)(12) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). Several states have also adopted
ombudsmen legislation. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 565(c), art. 70B, § 4(a) (1978); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 52:27G-1-16 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
329. The Colorado Nursing Home Ombudsman was located in the office of the Denver Legal
Aid Society for several years, but because of its strong pro-resident, often controversial, positions
it was moved by the state Medicaid Agency to the State Office on Aging. See generally Regan,
supra note 302, at 698, 704.
330. Barney, Community Presence as a Key to Quality of Life in Nursing Homes, 64 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 265 (1974).
331. For information about Citizens for Better Care, write: 163 Madison, Detroit, Mich.
48226 (313-962-5571).
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North Carolina,332 Save the Village Nursing Home in New York
City,333 and the National Citizens' Coalition for Nursing Home Re-
form 33 4 have been effective advocates for nursing home patients' rights
at the local, state and national levels. Many more such groups must be
established to assure active, regular and continuing public involvement
in nursing home activities.
Meaningful public involvement in nursing home quality monitor-
ing and enforcement can take the form of broad scale legislative and
administrative advocacy, as well as concern with the care provided by a
single facility or the appropriateness of placing an individual in a given
nursing home. This public participation at all levels cannot occur un-
less adequate information is made available to the public about condi-
tions in facilities and facility compliance with licensing and Medicare-
Medicaid standards. The federal Medicaid and Medicare statutes, as
amended in 1972, require public disclosure of the certification survey
reports; 335 these provisions were enacted as the result of successful liti-
gation in various states requiring disclosure under the federal Freedom
of Information Act.336 Since the federal law only requires that the defi-
ciency lists (and facility responses) be made available by the certifica-
tion agency, the Medicaid agency and the local office of the Social
Security Administration,337 public access to the reports under this law
is somewhat limited. Some state laws, however, expressly authorize
such disclosure of licensing inspection reports.338
A few states now require that facilities either post citations or defi-
ciency lists they receive, 339 make the information available to any pro-
spective resident upon request,340 or publish the citations. 34I The
requirement of posting notices of violation can certainly serve as a de-
332. For information ibout Friends of Nursing Home Patients, write: 207 Wilson Court,
Chapel Hill, N.C. 27514 (919-967-6198).
333. For information about Save the Village Nursing Home, which assumed ownership of a
facility in Greenwich Village for which the state had obtained appointment of a receiver, write:
Friends and Relatives of Institutionalized Aged, 400 E. 26th Street, N.Y., N.Y. 10010.
334. For more information, write: 1424 16th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.
335. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395aa(a), 1396(a)(27) (1976).
336. See generally Regan, Quality Assurance Systems in Nursing Homes, 53 J. URa. L. REv.
153, 196-98 (1975).
337. 42 C.F.R. § 431.115(f) (1978).
338. See, eg., W. VA. CODE § 16-5C-16 (Supp. 1978).
339. See, eg., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1429 (West Cum. Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT.
§ 39-935 (Cum. Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144A-10(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
340. See, eg., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 50.04(3)(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
341. Kansas law requires publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in
which the facility is located. KAN. STAT. § 39-946(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978). Iowa law requires the
state licensing agency to publish annually a list of the facilities with and without citations and the
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terrent to facility violations of licensing standards and as a means of
informing the public of the relative status of the nursing home. One
must ponder the effect of such public deficiency notices upon the psy-
chological and emotional well-being of the residents in the facility.
The discomfort of knowing one resides in a substandard facility, how-
ever, is probably outweighed by the need to correct violations and per-
mit public knowledge.
Several states are experimenting with approaches to encourage
greater public and community involvement in nursing home quality
assurance. California and Iowa permit any person to request a facility
inspection upon written complaint and protect the identity of the com-
plainant from disclosure. 342 The complainant may, however, accom-
pany the inspector if he or she wishes.343 Although this authorization
of citizen participation in nursing home surveys is rarely used in Cali-
fornia,34 it could be an important source of community involvement.
Access of resident advocates and interested members of the public
to nursing homes has often been a source of difficulty.345 Cases author-
izing the public to enter private property imbued with a public purpose
have provided some relief for this problem,346 but subsequent pro-
nouncements from the Supreme Court have characterized such appar-
ently public property as shopping centers as private and have
substantially undercut rights of public access.347 Some state laws ex-
pressly provide the right of access to facilities by "members of recog-
nized community organizations and community legal services
"1348 couts1programs, and courts have enforced these provisions.349
Some states have established various types of community advisory
actions taken on each citation. IOWA CODE ANN. § 135C.38 (West Cum. Supp. 1978). See also
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1420 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
342. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1419 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 135C.38 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
343. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1420 (West Cum. Supp. 1979); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 135C.38(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
344. Interview with Bill Smith, Chief of Health Services Section, Licensing and Certification
Division, California Dep't of Health (Dec. 23, 1977).
345. See The Health Law Project, Legal Problems Inherent in Organizing Nursing Home Occu-
pants, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 203, 203-06 (1972).
346. See, e.g., Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 308 (1945).
347. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
348. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 16-5C-5(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1978). See also OHIO REv. STAT.
ANN. § 3721.14(D) (Page Cum. Supp. 1978); MASSACHUSETTS ATTORNEY GENERAL, RULES AND
REGULATIONS RELATING TO NURSING HOMES, rule 4 (1975).
349. Commonwealth v. Q.T. Service, Inc., No. 78-564 (Mass. Sup. Ct., Jan. 31, 1978) (order
granting temporary restraining order).
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boards or committees to provide oversight and input into the nursing
home enforcement process. Minnesota, for example, has a fifteen-
member state Nursing Home Advisory Council to the Department of
Health, which has representatives of residents and the public as mem-
bers, although it is dominated by persons who either control nursing
homes or provide services to them.3
In Iowa, Care Review Committees, composed of disinterested citi-
zens appointed by local health planning agencies, must exist for each
nursing home in the state. The committees' function is to "represent
the rights" of nursing home residents, process complaints, and "con-
sider" their personal and social needs to determine if they are being
met.35' The committee members may not, however, examine medical
records or medical needs.3 52 The committees, which have been func-
tioning for about two years, have been criticized for ineffectiveness,
partially due to lack of training. Out of 4000 nursing home complaints
submitted to the state Health Department in 1977, only twelve had
come through the Care Review Committees, although they are statuto-
rily responsible for accepting and processing complaints.353 Further-
more, the committees have no enforcement authority except to report
to the Department for follow-up and possible citation.
North Carolina has adopted similar legislation, requiring county-
wide community advisory committees for nursing homes appointed by
the county commissioners and nursing home administrators. 54 Each
committee has the responsibility to visit each home in the county quar-
terly, apprise itself of conditions in the home, and "work for the best
interests" of the residents, including representing them in grievances
with the facility.55 While there is no experience yet with these
committees, their authority seems broader than that of the advisory
committees in Iowa, and they may provide more effective community
involvement in quality of care enforcement.
These diverse experiments to involve the public in nursing home
affairs and quality of care enforcement are critical both to an effective
350. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144A.17 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
35 1. IOWA CODE ANN. § 135C.25 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); IOWA DEP'T OF HEALTH, RULES
AND REGULATIONS FOR SKILLED NURSING FACILITIES § 470-59.32 (1978).
352. IOWA DEP'T OF HEALTH, RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR SKILLED NURSING FACILITIES
§ 470-59.32(3)(b) (1978).
353. Interview with Randi Youells, Staff Attorney, Legal Services Corporation of Iowa, in Des
Moines, Iowa (Nov. 14, 1978).




and vital state enforcement system and to the continuous provision of a
high quality of care in the facilities. Without active community sup-
port and prodding, state licensing agencies languish and fail to fulfill
their public responsibilities. Cooperation and, when necessary, healthy
conflict can maintain an appropriate level of energy and dedication in
the state agency. Even without such coordination, greater public
knowledge about and concern for nursing homes and their residents
can provide more informed placement decisions, more meaningful ad-
vocacy to facilities on behalf of residents, and a more open atmosphere
in nursing homes that is bound to provide a higher quality of resident
services.356 Furthermore, the better the community understands the
problems and needs of the elderly, the more likely it will be to propose,
develop and fund noninstitutional alternatives and to provide a gener-
ally more dignified and humane approach to long-term health care
services. The ultimate result of public knowledge and scrutiny should
be a significant improvement in the quality of long-term care.
IV. COSTS OF IMPROVED NURSING HOME QUALITY ENFORCEMENT
In view of the general theme of this symposium, a legitimate ques-
tion to ask is what would be the costs of the various proposed solutions
to quality of care enforcement in nursing homes. It has been alleged
that the costs of legal enforcement actions and facility appeals under
the California citation system are extreme.357 Similarly, imposition of
receiverships, 58 especially those requiring additional outlays of state
funds to correct deficiencies, 3 59 could be considerable. On the other
hand, shifting the approach of the Medicare-Medicaid Conditions of
Participation to a resident focus, using a resident assessment instru-
ment, could save resources. By surveying facilities and residents on a
sample basis, using computers, and eliminating surveyor and facility
time now alloted to "paper compliance" with the extant structural stan-
dards, a revitalized system could actually cost less than the current en-
356. See generally Barney, supra note 330.
357. See note 204 supra.
358. A group of economists analyzing the impact of housing code enforcement on rents con-
cluded that of the three enforcement remedies studied (repair and deduct, withholding rent and
receivership), receivership had a statistically significant impact on rent increases. Hirsch, Hirsch
& Margolis, Regression Analysis of the Effects of Habitability Laws upon Rent: An Empirical Obser-
vation on the .4ckerman-Komesar Debate, 63 CALIF. L. REa. 1098, 1129 (1975). The authors ex-
amined only the cost increases for the consumers of housing, not other costs associated with
enforcement of housing codes, but the analogy to enforcing nursing home quality of care should
be considered.
359. See notes 243-45 supra.
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forcement system. The development of noninstitutional community-
based resources for long-term care and the diversion of the current
Medicaid emphasis from nursing homes to these more appropriate
services, could also be more economical than paying for nursing home
services alone, although whether cost savings would result in each case
would depend upon the precise mix of services required. The National
Institute on Aging has suggested that concentrating on medical inter-
vention for the elderly instead of socioeconomic considerations is more
costly to society in both fiscal and human terms?
60
V. CONCLUSION
The history of nursing home services in the United States and gov-
ernment regulation of their quality has been shameful. After many
years of recognized abuse and failure, new methods of enforcing the
quality of care in nursing homes by revision of standards, incentive
reimbursement and more varied licensing compliance remedies are
now being adopted. Early indications of their effectiveness provide
some hope for success. As the number of elderly needing long-term
health care services increases exponentially and the costs of nursing
home care skyrocket, we owe the older generation and the taxpayer the
assurance that care is delivered in a responsible, high quality, humane
and cost-efficient manner. The effectiveness of government regulation
of health care has not been highly regarded by the public. Nursing
home surveyors are easily demoralized by industry pressure and public
apathy. No merely cosmetic or organizational changes will assist these
regulators in performing their public duties more creatively. The regu-
latory system must be revitalized and reconstructed to examine more
closely the care delivered to nursing home residents, and the public
must be involved in the ongoing conduct of local nursing care facilities
to encourage delivery of good care and to support regulatory efforts. In
light of the frequent attacks on the costly and ineffective nature of regu-
lation, the development in the next decade of a regulatory system that
assures high quality nursing home care will be a major test of the
potential of government regulation in a field in which success is critical
to the quality of human life.
360. See Butler, supra note 1, at 1797.
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